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Abstract 
 
Title:   Determinants of IPO underpricing - A comparison between the  
UK and Germany 
   
Date:   2014-05-26 
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Purpose:   The purpose of this study is to investigate the influencing factors 
on underpricing in the UK and Germany. The focus hereby lies on 
the different institutional framework (common and civil law) and 
implied ownership structure of both countries. 
 
 
Methodology: A quantitative analysis is conducted using multiple linear 
regression model and descriptive statistics. The dependent 
variable underpricing is regressed on country- and firm-specific 
variables. The underlying OLS aussumptions are tested and 
robustness tests of the findings are performed. 
 
Theoretical 
perspective:  This study is based on prior research that explores stock market  
and or firm specific data to investigate underpricing patterns of 
IPOs. Furthermore, the impact of a countries institutional 
framework on underpricing is analysed and insights on the 
respective implied ownership structure is provided.  
 
Empirical 
foundation:   The analysis includes 177 IPOs listed on the UK and German 
stock exchanges (LSE, AIM, FSE) during 2009-2013. Data was 
obtained from the S&P IQ Capital Database. 
 
 
Conclusion:   The outcomes of this study indicate that the UK as common law 
country encourages underpricing, which contradicts previous 
empirical research. Characteristics of institutional framework, 
such as legal enforcement and quality of legal framework, are 
positively and negatively related to underpricing respectively. It is 
further found that the implied ownership structures for both legal 
origins seem to favour blockholder in the after-crisis period. 
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1 Introduction 
The first chapter introduces the topic by explaining the background. A detailed problem 
discussion and identification of the research gap follows. This results in the specific 
purpose and research questions established for this study. Finally, this section gives a 
short overview of delimitations that set the parameters for data collection and analysis 
and an outline guiding the reader through the remaining report. 
 
1.1 Background 
The European Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) market in the young 21st century already 
faced drastic changes in the economic and regulatory market environment. The bursting 
of the dot-com-bubble1 in 2000 or the implementation of Basel II2 are only extracts of 
these cutting events. A striking rise and fall of the Euro NM markets3 and a substantial 
increase of bookbuilding as a pricing and allocation mechanism in IPOs are further 
important features (Ritter, 2003). The tension in the IPO market peaked when the global 
financial crisis hit Europe in 2008. That caused not only the emission activity and share 
prices, but also the stock exchange indices to collapse (Glavina, 2013). Compared to 
2008, the activity on the European exchanges fell by 57% in 2009 from previously 295 
to 126 IPOs annually. Additionally, a decline of 49% in total offering value from 
€13.953 in 2008 to €7.112 in 2009 is mirrored (PwC, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the market conditions are influenced by the instability in the political 
environment and the debt crisis in Europe, which has a permanent impact on the 
confidence of investors (Glavina, 2013). ‘IPO activity across European exchanges has 
continued to suffer in 2009, largely due to the worldwide loss of investor confidence 
and the global economic crisis’, as stated in the IPO European market report 2009 by 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) (2010, p.1). Considering the extreme diverse 
                                                
1 Dot-com-bubble refers to the stock price bubble of Internet companies in the late 1990s. 
2 Basel II, first published 2004, the second of Basel Committee on Bank Supervision’s, which sets 
minimum capital requirements for financial institutions. 
3 NM refers to the ‘Neuer Markt’ segment on the German stock exchange for high-tech growth firms 
during the new economy period, which was introduced 1997 and finally closed in 2002. Similar 
segments were introduced in other European markets as well. 
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scenarios, the IPO market in Europe and its participants have been exposed to, 
coherently generate new vibrant fields of study and challenge existing research.  
 
The recent events have driven the seemingly mature IPO research further by the 
existence of three apparent anomalies: issuing activity, underpricing, and long-run 
underperformance (Günther and Rummer, 2006). In this context a well-documented 
phenomenon is the underpricing (UPR) of IPOs4 (Engelen and Essen, 2010). The 
existing research and results indicate that underpricing in IPOs occurs worldwide, while 
attempting to explain the apparent contraction with market efficiency. 
 
The shares that initially are sold to the public are defined as underpriced when the first 
day trading price exceeds the final offer price and thus the share price experiences a 
substantial jump (Ljungqvist, 2007). An extensive body of research tried to explain the 
underpricing in IPOs with different models that can be broadly categorized as 
information revelation, targeting particular investors, and conflicts of interest 
(Jenkinson and Jones, 2004). In relation to these models, empirical evidence shows the 
first-order effect on underpricing due to information frictions. The vast variation in the 
extent of underpricing over time challenges the impact of additional explanations, 
especially in a cross-country test perspective (Ljungqvist, 2007; Hopp and Dreher, 
2007).  
 
1.2 Problem discussion 
There is a large number of partly contradictory explanations for the underpricing 
phenomenon. Early investigations focus on the existence of information frictions and 
agency problems as justification for first-day price jumps5. More recent research tries to 
find further explanations for instance in a countries´ legal structure and strategic goals 
of participants involved in the IPO process6. 
 
                                                
4  For example, Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Rock (1986), Ibbotson et al. (1994), Jenksinon and 
Ljungqvist (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002, 2003), Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), among others. 
5  Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984), Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Welch (1992), among 
others. 
6  Alavi et al. (2008), Boulton et al. (2010), Brennan and Franks (1997), Engelen and Essen (2010), Hopp 
and Dreher (2007), Pham et al. (2003), among others. 
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The extreme variations of underpricing open up for further potential research topics. As 
stated by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), ‘it strains belief that even collectively this 
body of theory can account for the profound change in market behaviour’ more 
research is suggested in explaining the underpricing phenomenon in the 21st century. 
 
However, empirical studies have mainly focused on the United States’ (US) market, but 
show immense differences in the degree of underpricing across countries7. Arising from 
this debate, it is of interest to explore the diverse country settings within Europe. A 
comparison of IPOs in the United Kingdom (UK) as a common law and Germany 
(GER) as a civil law country is considered as particularly interesting with regards to 
differences in legal framework, and hence ownership structure.  
 
The origin and characteristics of firms going public were found to affect the level of 
underpricing (La Porta et al., 2002). In general, common law countries show a higher 
degree of investor protection and like the UK have a more developed financial market, 
whereas French civil law countries have the lowest class of investor protection. In 
between these two extremes are the civil law systems of Scandinavian and German 
origin (Engelen and Essen, 2010). Empirical evidence generally suggests that 
underpricing is less severe in countries with a high level of shareholder protection and a 
good quality of institutional framework (Engelen and Essen, 2010; Hopp and Dreher, 
2007; Shi et al., 2007). An overview of the level of underpricing for the respective 
representatives – UK, GER, and France – of a countries legal system is shown in Table 
1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Engelen and Essen, 2010; Hopp and Dreher, 2007; Boulton et al., 2010; Ritter, 2013; Loughran et al., 
1994; among others. 
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Table 1: Empirical findings in previous IPO literature 
Author Period 
Germany United Kingdom France 
N Mean* N Mean* N Mean* 
Shi et al., 2007 1995-2002 281 0,458 305 0,366 306 0,187 
Engelen & Essen, 2010 2000-2005 132 0,372 471 0,202 171 0,131 
Hopp & Dreher, 2007 1988-2005 513 0,378 838 0,139 462 0,123 
Boulton et al., 2009 2000-2006 223 0,300 1034 0,177 282 0,126 
Lin et al., 2013 1991-2011 349 0,218 188 0,269 494 0,175 
* mean 1st Day returns = underpricing             
(Source: created by authors) 
 
The UK institutional framework on one hand favours small investors and thus promotes 
a wider shareholder breadth (SB). Some researchers argue that greater ownership 
dispersion requires a higher level of underpricing. The German system on the other 
hand, favours more concentrated ownership and larger shareholders, which induce a 
lower level of underpricing (Pham et al., 2003; Brennan and Franks, 1997; Engelen and 
Essen, 2010; Boulton et al., 20108). This contradicts the argument of weaker legal 
protection – for German civil law – and higher level of underpricing. Nonetheless, in 
times of economic downturns and crisis the established theories could be reversed due 
to the fact that civil law structures usually are associated with lower debt levels and 
therefore lower distress risk and uncertainty involved in the IPO process (La Porta et 
al., 1997, 1998). This conflict is the focus of the present study and is investigated by 
comparing the underpricing of IPOs in UK and Germany in the post-financial crisis 
period. 
 
There has been empirical research on the two extremes UK and France (Cahine et al., 
20079) and even on the UK and Germany (Goergen and Renneboog, 200710). The 
mentioned articles focused on different factors and periods that determine underpricing. 
However, to the researchers best knowledge there is no study focussing on Germany 
with its bank-based system and the UK with its market-based system in the aftermath of 
                                                
8 Boultonet al. (2010) studied a sample of 4,461 IPOs across 29 countries during 2000-2004. 
9 Cahineet al. (2007) studied a sample of 444 IPOs in the UK and France during 1996-2002 from which 
303 were UK and 141 were French companies. 
10 Goergen and Renneboog (2007) analyzed a sample of 764 UK and 98 German IPOs (total sample: 862) 
during 1981-1988. 
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the recent financial crisis. The different set ups of the two institutional systems may be 
especially exposed to such conflicts and have not yet been investigated with regards to 
influences and evolvements of underpricing during the period after the financial crisis 
from 2009-2013. Table 2 shows an overview of related historical literature with 
information on the different theories explaining IPO underpricing, periods and countries 
that were investigated. Germany and the UK are particularly interesting since they 
represent Europe’s largest and most established stock exchanges. 
 
Table 2: Overview of previous literature 
Recent 
Researcher 
Asymmetric 
Information Institutional 
Ownership and 
Control 
Behavioural 
Explanations Sample Geography Period 
Chambers & 
Dimson, 2009  
X X  UK 1917-2007 
Zheng & Li, 
2008   
X  US 1993-2000 
Nagata, 2013    X Japan 1989-2005 
Bessler et al., 
2014 
X    Germany 1998-2008 
Hoque, 2014 X X   UK 1999-2006 
Georgen & 
Renneboog, 
2007 
  X  Germany, UK 1981-1994 
Engelen & 
Essen, 2010  
X   Europe 2000-2005 
Alavi et al., 
2008   
X  Australia 1995-2005 
Boulton et al., 
2009 & 2010 
X  X  Global 2000-2004 
Lin et al., 
2013  
X   Global 1991-2011 
(Source: created by authors) 
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1.3 Purpose and research question 
The main objective of this study is based on the research gap identified in the previous 
paragraph. It will thus add further empirical insight and knowledge with regards to IPO 
underpricing and its influencing factors in the most recent years. Further explanations 
for the driving factors of the underpricing phenomenon of IPOs with respect to a cross-
country perspective after severe periods, i.e. the financial crisis, is provided.  
The central question in this dissertation asks how IPO underpricing in the UK and 
Germany, as representative inter-European countries of common and civil law, is 
influenced by differences in institutional frameworks, particularly in the aftermath of 
the recent financial crisis. In order to answer the main question, several sub questions 
were established.  
 
The resulting research questions are the following: 
 
Main research question: 
1. How does the institutional (legal) framework affect the level of IPO 
underpricing in the UK and Germany as European representatives of common 
and civil law countries? 
Sub-questions: 
2. What are the main influencing factors of IPO underpricing in Europe? 
3. Is there a difference in the level of underpricing between civil law (Germany) 
and common law (UK) IPOs? 
4. How does the legal origin implied ownership structure influence the level of 
underpricing in IPO firms? 
 
The findings of this study intent to contribute to existing research and reveal possible 
strategic implementations for the participants involved in the IPO process, depending on 
the country´s legal origin. 
 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
16 
1.4 Delimitations 
The researchers set boundaries to this study in order to clearly define the parameters of 
investigation. The project is limited to a period of eight weeks. Because of the extensive 
literature available, it is chosen to focus on major reputable authors like Jay Ritter, 
Alexander Ljungqvist, Charles Shi, Engelen and Essen, and Rafael La Porta, who offer 
comprehensive empirical research reports, also in corporation with other authors. The 
indices considered in the analysis are taken from previous literature and thus might not 
be applicable to the investigated period since the financial crisis had a large impact on 
laws and regulations. Further, all amounts stated in GBP (British Pound) are converted 
into Euro at historical exchange rates. This is a potential source of biases in the 
presented results. The sample population of 252 IPOs during 2009-2013 is restricted to 
a final sample size of 177 companies due to alignment and comparability reasons. 
 
1.5 Outline 
The remaining paper is divided into four main parts. The following chapter examines 
previous literature and empirical findings on IPOs and mispricing in general as well as 
specifically for the UK and Germany. It results in the development of five hypotheses 
that are based on historical literature. The third chapter deals with the methodological 
framework of this study and introduces the research approach, data collection methods 
as well as an introduction to the regression model applied. Further, the reliability and 
validity of regression results are assessed at the end of the same chapter. In the 
following Chapter 4 the empirical results are presented, moving from descriptive 
statistics to the regression and hypotheses testing results. The final chapter offers an 
interpretation and critique of the findings, tying up the various theoretical and empirical 
outcomes in order to derive a logical conclusion. Then the results are being applied to 
possible strategic implementations for participants involved in the IPO process. 
Potential future research topics are indicated at the end of that chapter. 
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2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
This chapter establishes the literature framework of this study. The rational of IPOs as 
well as the process of introducing a company to the market are explained. Then, 
different theories of the underpricing phenomenon are introduced and critically 
reviewed. After summarising the previous empirical findings, the chapter concludes in 
establishing relevant hypotheses from the previous literature findings. 
 
2.1 Initial Public Offerings 
2.1.1 Rational of IPOs 
Raising funds through a stock market offering is often very cost intensive (Ritter, 1987; 
Barry et al., 1991). This raises the question, why firms initially take the step to enter the 
stock market and go public. Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997) emphasize four different 
reasons: (i) to obtain new finance; (ii) to enhance a company’s image and increase its 
publicity; (iii) to motivate managers and other employees; (iv) to ´cash in´ by selling off 
shares. The access to alternative sources of funds makes an important watershed in the 
life of a young company. At the same time the company acquires new obligations 
concerning transparency and disclosure requirements. In this context, Röell (1996, p. 
1079) concludes that there must be additional benefits to compensate this costly trade 
off, like ´an informative stock price, a more liquid stock, and increased competition 
among providers of finance.´ Overall, the stock market provides a venue for trading the 
companies’ shares and allows existing shareholders to differentiate their portfolio 
(Ljungqvist, 2007).  
 
The start in the process of going public is marked with the choice of exchange upon 
which the new shares will be traded. Then a prospectus containing the relevant statutory 
authority needs to be filed by the issuer. The fulfilment of listing requirements and the 
different IPO mechanisms are important cornerstones for a company before going 
public. A period of marketing and public subscription to IPO begins subsequently. The 
process is finally concluded with the public trading of the issue (Shi et al., 2007). 
Appendix XVI shows a brief overview of the general IPO process in Europe.   
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2.1.2 Different IPO mechanisms 
There are different pricing methods, which have proven to affect underpricing. Initial 
pricing and allocation mechanisms can be categorized into: fixed-price offerings, 
auctions, bookbuilding and hybrid offerings. 
 
In a fixed price regime the offer price is set after which investors are able to submit 
their orders at the predetermined rate. This has historically been the dominant approach 
in the UK and in most of Europe (Benveniste and Busaba, 1997). Subsequent investors 
could adopt earlier investors purchasing decision and ignore their own private 
information. Welch (1992) argues that the fixed price method uniquely offers the 
potential to exploit the market structure and prevent information aggregation by pricing 
the issue low enough i.e. underprice, to attract primary investors and thus create a 
subsequent high demand. The rules for allocating shares in fixed price offerings can 
differ and be either non-discretionary e.g. UK, Finland, or discretionary e.g. Germany, 
Sweden. However, fixed price offerings have become uncommon in most of the 
European countries in recent years (Ritter, 2003).  
 
Different to fixed price offers, in terms of price determination and information produced 
throughout the offering, is an IPO auction (Chemmanur and Liu, 2006). In an auction, 
investors place an order that includes a certain number of shares at a desired offer price. 
Based on the binding orders an auction price mechanism assigns the shares (Engelen 
and Essen, 2010). Thus, the price is determined as a result of various competing 
informed bidders11, but unlike in fixed price offerings mainly outsiders produce the 
information. Throughout the auction these investors will compete away much of the 
surplus with those investors that know best about the true value of the firm. 
Consequently, IPO auctions are considered to be theoretically optimal in terms of 
maximizing proceeds, since auctions or tender offers allow market demand to at least 
partially influence the issue price (Chemmanur and Liu, 2006). Hence, auction-like 
mechanisms such as tender in the UK or the Netherlands are usually associated with a 
lower level of underpricing (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 1996; Derrien and Womack, 
2003). Nevertheless, the practice of auction and fixed price mechanisms has tended to 
                                                
11 Informed investors are referred to as institutional and uninformed investors are referred to as retail 
investors respectively. 
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decline in Europe. Auctions even disappeared completely in Germany, but rarely exist 
in the UK (Gajewski and Gresse, 2006).  
 
A number of previous articles have documented the decline of these two mechanisms 
for pricing IPOs in Europe and instead support the growth of bookbuilding procedures 
(Biais and Faugeron, 2002; Sherman, 2005; Ljungqvist et al., 2003). It is an 
introduction method in which the underwriter, requests signs of interest from 
institutional investors consisting of a bid and quantity of demanded shares and possibly 
a maximum price i.e. limit price. Based on investors’ indications of interest, the 
underwriter sets a price range for the shares to be placed. The fact that pricing and 
allocation rules are not announced, leaves these actions to the full discretion of the 
underwriter i.e. investment banker (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001). The majority of the 
theoretical literature emphasises that bookbuilding enhances information transfer about 
the value of the stock throughout the procedure and thus price the issue more 
accurately. The investors, who reveal information, are compensated with a favourable 
allocation of shares by the underwriter (Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Spatt and 
Srivastava, 1991). There is proven evidence that countries that use bookbuilding 
generally have less underpricing compared to countries that commit to fixed price 
offerings (e.g. Ritter, 1988; Loughran et al., 1994). According to previous researchers, 
bookbuilding is an optimal dynamic mechanism where the different phases i.e. road-
show12 and pre-marketing period, prior to the actual IPO serve as an information 
extraction process. Jenkinson and Jones (2004) or Ljungvist (2003) claim the 
uncertainty about the final price is small and prices outside the preliminary range 
seldom occur. The bookbuilding as an IPO mechanism has been used increasingly 
during the 1990s and represents the standard procedure conducted by banks in European 
domestic offerings since the late 1990s (Ljungqvis tet al., 2003). 
 
Ljungqvist et al. (2000) declare that after bookbuilding has been introduced 
internationally, its use increased by about 80% of non-US offerings brought to the 
market or some hybrid, which was largely a phenomenon in Europe. Since then many 
countries have used hybrids that combine any two of the three IPO mechanisms. There 
exist auction/public offer and auction/bookbuilding hybrid IPOs, while the most 
                                                
12 A road-show refers to the managements´ activity and presentations to advertise their IPO shares. 
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commonly exercised hybrid is bookbuilding/public offer. This is also the case for both 
UK and GER as illustrated in Appendix XIV regarding the different IPO mechanisms 
by country. The general practise for hybrids is that bookbuilding is used to set the price 
and allocate the shares either to institutional or foreign investors. Whereas for retail 
investors that do not take part in the price setting, a public offer tranche is reserved 
(Jagannathan and Sherman, 2006).  In France, only sequential hybrids in which the 
price must be set a long time in advance was allowed. Derrien and Womack (2003) 
found in their study that this procedure was less efficient. This is confirmed by 
Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), who suggest that setting the price too early adds risk 
and hence requires higher levels of underpricing13. A degree of freedom is removed for 
some hybrids, especially in the UK, that include an automatic clawback provision, 
which enables retail investors to adjust their demand on feedback received from 
institutional investors. The clawback provision forces the banker to reassign shares 
when retail investors spot strong demand by institutional investors and thus follow a 
suit. Consequently, incentives for institutional investors to show strong interest will be 
weak, while facing the fear to be crowded out (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 200214).  
 
2.1.3 Principal theories explaining IPO underpricing 
In the 70s, early writers, notably Ibbotson (1975) documented the shares of companies 
that go public, tend to be underpriced and that on the first day of trading the share price 
jumps significantly. Since 1980s, this ‘underpricing discount’ has tended to fluctuate to 
a great extent, averaging at 7% in the 1980s, which increased to 15% in the 1990s. After 
peaking at 65% during the burst of the dot-com-bubble and averaged at 22% in the four 
years since 2000 (Gajewski and Gresse, 200615).  Hence, IPO firms appear to leave 
considerable amounts of ´money-left-on-the-table’16 denoting indirect costs to a firms 
owner, when the shares sold for personal account at a too low price.  The extensive 
theoretical literature trying to validate underpricing, established models that are 
confronted with ever changing settings and data, but can be broadly grouped into: 
asymmetric information, institutional explanations, ownership and control, and 
                                                
13 This is a problem specifically for France, and sequential hybrids, where open pricing allows fixing the 
offering price shortly before shares begin trading.  
14 Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) studied a sample of 1,032 IPOs worldwide between 1990-2000. 
15 Gajewski and Gresse (2006) investigated a sample of 2,307 IPOs in 15 European countries. 
16 Money-left-on-the-table as defined by Ritter (1984) represents the difference of first-day closing price 
less offer price times the number of shares sold at the IPO. 
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behavioural explanations (Ljungqvist, 2007). This subchapter intends to outline the 
principal theories of IPO underpricing and discuss their empirical evidence.  
 
2.1.3.1 Asymmetric information models 
Research on information asymmetries as an explanation for underpricing focuses on the 
different levels and access to information throughout the listing process between 
numerous participants including the IPO firm, banks-underwriters, entrepreneurs, and 
external investors (Cahine et al., 2007) 17 . All theories of underpricing based on 
asymmetric information have a common believe that underpricing is positively 
correlated to the degree of asymmetric information (Ljungqvist, 2007).  
 
One of the best-known asymmetric information model is Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse, 
which is an application of Akerlof’s (1970) lemon problem, presumed that issuing firms 
are better informed than investors (Günther and Rummer, 2006). The uninformed 
investor buys new shares intuitively, while the informed investor only subscribes to 
more appealing shares in an IPO. In a winner’s curse, the uninformed investors receive 
all the shares they have bid for in unattractive offerings i.e. overpriced IPOs, but only a 
partial allocation of underpriced IPOs in attractive offerings (Ljungqvist, 2007). Thus, 
the uninformed investors receive an expected return below the average unconditional 
i.e. underpriced, or even negative return (Ritter and Welch, 2002). For the IPO market 
Rock (1986) assumes that demand of the uninformed investors is needed, in the sense 
that the participation of only informed investors is insufficient to transact all existing 
shares on offer. To avoid an IPO market that is only populated by (equally) informed 
investors, because uninformed investors are unwilling to bid, underpricing is needed on 
average for them to expect a positive return or at least to break even (Ljungqvist, 2007). 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) extend this model showing that the level of underpricing is 
positively correlated to the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the firm with respect 
to investment banks price setting. Since underpricing is a cost attributed to the firm, this 
induces an incentive to free ride for an individual entity, when underpricing too little. 
The empirical results from Koh and Walter (1989) in Singapore and Levis (1990) for 
the UK confirm this relationship. In addition to Rocks theory, pricing too high might 
                                                
17 Within the available space it seems not possible to cover all theoretical and empirical contributions. For 
a comprehensive survey of the large scope of literature, see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Ritter and 
Welch (2002), and Ljungqvist (2007). 
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induce a negative cascade proposed by Welch (1992). The view that investors try to 
evaluate the interest of other investors is supported by, Amihud et al. (2001) findings, 
that IPOs tend to be either undersubscribed or hugely oversubscribed.  
 
Another theory reverses Rock´s (1986) assumptions regarding the informational 
asymmetry between issuing firms and investors, namely signalling models that use 
underpricing as a signal of a firms quality (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and 
Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989). Even though it is clearly costly, underpricing may be used 
to signal the company’s ‘true’ high value, if companies have superior information about 
potential future risks in order to ‘leave a good taste in investors’ mouths’ (Ibbotson, 
1975). However, evidence for these signalling theories is somewhat mixed. The 
empirical results of Jegadeesh et al. (1993) do not support the signalling models and 
instead find no distinction in returns at and after the first day. Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) reject signalling and note, the decision of the degree of underpricing and whether 
to reissue18 equity at a later stage are not independent of each other in the signalling 
context.  
 
In this framework the different introduction methods, mainly fixed price offers and 
bookbuildings, have been investigated. Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and 
Wilhelm (1990), and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) focus on the most common practise of 
bookbuilding in many countries and argue that this method gives underwriters wide 
discretion over the allocation of shares and thus allows them to obtain information from 
informed investors throughout the listing process. Hence, the bookbuilding method 
mitigates the incentive to misrepresent positive information, since this investor will be 
excluded from the IPO. At the same time, favourable investors that bid aggressively are 
rewarded by a larger allocation of shares (Ljungqvist, 2007). Nevertheless, certain 
restrictions, common in for instance in Europe and Asia19, may interfere with the 
efficiency and force bidders to rely more on price than on allocations. This extended 
framework, to allow for costly information gathering, is studied by Sherman (2000) and 
Sherman and Titman (2002), who suggest that it is the information gathering constraint, 
instead of the truth-telling constraint, that determines pricing and allocation of shares. 
                                                
18 Reissue refers to the theory of share repurchases as an indication of undervaluation. 
19 Some parts of Europe and Asia require a certain fraction of shares that have to be allocated to retail 
(uninformed) investors.  
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
23 
Hanley (1993) finds evidence in favour of bookbuilding theories, that the price revision 
over the course of the process and the first-day underpricing return are positively 
correlated. This is often referred to as ‘partial adjustment’ phenomenon, which 
indicates that underwriters do not sufficiently adjust their pricing upward to keep 
underpricing constant in situations of strong demand i.e. more positive information is 
revealed. Consistent with the information revelation theory of bookbuilding, Cornelli 
and Goldreich (2001, 2003), and Jenkinson and Jones (2004), show informed investors 
request more and preferentially receive more allocations in the IPO process.20 
 
Moreover, the important role of investment banks in extracting information that is 
valuable in the price setting and their discretion over share allocation, highlights the 
potential for agency problems. The allocation and trading based research of IPO shares 
is most prominently emphasized by Loughran and Ritter (2004). Among others, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) suggested the incentive of insiders in bargaining over 
the offer price and the degree of underpricing, depends on their involvement in the deal 
and wealth effects for shareholders. The researchers claim, that conflicts are potentially 
severe, whenever underwriters own stake or a company underwrites the IPO itself21. 
These findings contradict a previous research of Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) 
who stated that investment banks suffered equally when underwriting their own IPOs. 
Another aspect stressed by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) is that the degree of 
underpricing is impacted by the quantity owners intend to sell. In line with the previous 
argument is the prospect theory proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2002) that 
determined the covariance of the money-left-on-the-table through underpricing and the 
owners’ wealth changes. Their findings have been challenged and stay in contrast to 
Wasserfallen and Wittleder (1994) that support the view that underpricing is negatively 
correlated to the owners’ retention rate22. Early models, linked to agency conflicts and 
IPO underpricing, focused on the informational advantages by banks and their 
exploiting in marketing and distribution of the stock traded. Circumstances where effort 
                                                
20 Jenkinson and Jones (2004) only find minor support but that can be attributed to different European 
Investment banks that have been taken into consideration in the studies.  
21 Their evidence reports, the greater the investment banks own stake in the process, the lower the first-
day underpricing returns.  
22 The study explores the hot-issue-period in Germany, where direct stock purchase (DSP) programs (also 
referred to as ’family and friends’ programs, that allow individuals to purchase a stock directly from a 
company or through a transfer agent and thus, avoids commission) became increasingly popular that 
might create incentive to underprice to favour to the targeted clients. 
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is not entirely observable might lead to a moral hazard situation for banks. Therefore, a 
screening model has been constructed by Baron and Holmström (1980), and Baron 
(1982), in order to reveal the underwriters’ benefit from underpricing.  
 
2.1.3.2 Institutional explanations 
The literature offers an additional explanation for IPO underpricing that is provided by 
institutional explanations, which focus on the three features of the marketplace – legal 
liability, price stabilization, and tax arguments.  
 
First, the legal liability has stimulated a legal insurance or lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, 
which indicates that underpricing reduces the likelihood and extent of future legal 
liability claims costs against issuers and underwriters and hence serves as a form of 
litigation insurance for these participants (Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Tinic, 1988). The 
basic idea that firms intentionally sell their stock at a discount to minimize the 
probability of future lawsuits from disappointed shareholders with the post-performance 
of their shares goes back at least to Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). This explanation 
is somewhat US-centric, but it is still possible that lawsuit avoidance is a second order 
of IPO underpricing .The stringent disclosure rules in the US expose underwriters and 
issuers to substantial risk of litigation by investors claiming important facts were stated 
misleadingly or omitted from the IPO prospectus (Ljungqvist, 2007). Since US 
companies are subject to a ‘quiet period’23 that requests the full content of relevant 
information in the written prospectus and not other documents, but those restrictions do 
not exist in Europe.  Thus, lawsuits are common in the US and rare in Europe (Ritter, 
2003).  
 
According to previous empirical findings the probability of being sued is not 
economically significant for instance in Finland (Keloharju 1993), Germany 
(Ljungqvist, 1995), or the UK (Jenkinson, 1990). Empirical evidence on the lawsuit 
hypothesis is, at best, mixed (Lin et al., 2013). Tinic (1988) and Lowry and Shu (2002) 
find evidence in support of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis in the US, whereas Drake 
and Vetsuypens (1993) find that underpricing did not protect IPOs from being sued, 
                                                
23 Starting from the decision to go public until 40 calendar days after, analysts that are affiliated with 
underwriters are prohibited from issuing research reports or recommendations.  
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thus is inconsistent with the legal insurance hypothesis. However, the discussion 
developed during the internet bubble, where concerns about the ‘lofty’ valuation of 
internet stocks were severe and anxiety for lawsuits alarmed underwriters who could not 
justify a higher offer price (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Ritter and Welch (2002) 
interpret underwriters’ actions as ‘leaning against the wind’ by not exploiting over-
optimism on the part of some investors at that time. Nevertheless, in general it can be 
concluded that the degree of litigation risk in a certain country has an effect on the 
extent of underpricing for companies in that country (Lin et al., 2013).  
 
Second, price stabilisation, as one of the services that underwriters provide in 
connection with an IPO, shows another institutional explanation of underpricing 
(Ljungqvist, 2007). This practice of price support, also referred to as ‘price 
manipulation’, is intended to reduce price drops after going public for a limited time 
and has a statistical implication. According to Ruud (1993), IPOs are not intentionally 
underpriced, but rather priced at expected market value. Those offerings whose prices 
loom to drop below the offer price experience support in the subsequent trading after 
going public. The price stabilisations seem to lead to a positive average price jump, 
which is largely due to a statistical affect24. The most recent research has emphasised the 
role of price support in reducing underpricing, because it creates a mechanism that ties 
underwriters and investors through the course of a bookbuilding procedure (Benveniste 
et al., 1996; Smith, 1986). They support the view that underwriters may have an 
incentive to increase the offer price, since their dollar fees increase in gross proceeds. 
The investors in the bookbuilding exercise might detect the unfavourable behaviour of 
underwriters and are positively influenced when underwriters commit in price support. 
Since the price support is costly for the underwriter, the investor is more likely to 
believe that the issue will not be deliberately overpriced (Ljungqvist, 2007).  
 
The empirical evidence remains unclear, whether and by how much, the provision of 
price support decreases the level of underpricing. Ruud (1993) argues that observed 
underpricing is the by-product of price support. This is contrary to the findings of 
Asquith et al. (1998) who claim that underpricing is a result of other factors than price 
support. In line with Benveniste et al.(1996), Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) propose that 
                                                
24 Such actions would tend to remove the left tail of the distribution of initial returns. 
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price stabilization decreases the need of underpricing. While for Benveniste et al.(1996) 
institutional investors and for Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) retail investors respectively 
are the main beneficiaries of price support.  
 
Finally, there may be tax advantages to IPO underpricing. This tax argument emerges 
from the different tax rates on employment income and capital gains (Ljungqvist, 2007). 
In this context Rydqvist (1997)25 concluded that this discrepancy in tax rates creates 
incentives to pay employees by allocating appreciating assets i.e. an underpriced stock 
instead of a normal salary.26 Analogue is Taranto’s (2003) argumentation that one 
characteristic of US tax law may induce managers to underprice their own company’s 
shares in an IPO. Managers pay income tax when exercising the option as well as when 
they eventually sell the underlying stock. Both tax payments are based on the residual 
of the strike price and sale price respectively to the ‘fair market value’. Due to the 
double taxation for managers holding employee stock options they prefer the ‘fair 
market value’ to be as low as possible (Ljungqvist, 2007). In other words this is a 
‘trade-off between the tax benefit and the dilution cost of underpricing’ (Ljungqvist, 
2007, p. 402).  
 
However, there is no empirical evidence for the explanatory power of tax arguments for 
underpricing in IPOs. These arguments could rather help to explain the cross-section of 
underprcing returns (Ljungqvist, 2007). Due to the similarity of tax rates on capital 
gains up to 28% for the UK and GER it is not assumed to play a role in this cross-
country context.  
 
2.1.3.3 Ownership and control 
Going public results in a significant change in the ownership structure of a business and 
thus, changing control mechanisms. That is why the structure of a firm and interests of 
decision makers and shareholders play an important role when investigating potential 
mispricing. Goergen and Renneboog (2007) argue that the discrepancy of interests 
between shareholders and management is the major disadvantage of going public. 
                                                
25 Rydqvist (1997) investigated Swedish IPOs before 1990, when Sweden taxed employment income was 
much higher than capital gains.  
26 The Swedish tax authorities removed the incentive to allocate underpriced stock to employees in 1990 
by making gains related to underpricing subject to income tax. 
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Potential arising agency conflicts between the participants involved in the IPO process 
(issuer, investor, and underwriter) and the role of underpricing in this context is 
investigated in this chapter. 
 
Intentional underpricing can be utilised as means to reduce the arising agency costs and 
to retain managerial control of the firm (Ljungqvist, 2007). The UK common law 
system favours minority shareholders, whereas the German civil law supports 
concentrated ownership and network effects (Cahine et al., 2007; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2007). Empirical research provides different interpretations of how 
ownership and control are associated with underpricing. 
 
Brennan and Franks (1997) studied the underpricing phenomenon in the UK and argue 
that it supports the retention of managerial control and entrenchment of agency costs by 
reducing monitoring requirements of large outside shareholders (´reduced monitoring 
hypothesis´). Managers therefore aim at creating an excess demand for shares by 
underpricing hence, being able to strategically allocate shares to small external 
shareholders. This is also supported by more recent studies like Boulton et al. (2010) 
who argue that ´underpricing is a cost that insiders pay to maintain control in countries 
with legal systems designed to empower outsiders´ (Boulton et al., 2010, p 206). As a 
result, the dispersion of ownership is relatively high, which enables managers to 
maintain control without the presence of major shareholders that require a high level of 
monitoring to reduce their own risk of investment failure (Brennan and Franks, 1997; 
Boulton et al., 2010). Smart and Zutter (200327) found the same trend of underpricing 
being positively related to ownership dispersion in the US IPO market. The presence of 
a large number of small investors on the other hand incurs adverse selection costs and 
leads to a higher degree of underpricing required when attracting them thus, leading to 
even higher indirect costs for the company (Pham et al., 200328). 
 
 
                                                
27 Smart and Zutter (2003) studied 253 US IPO firms between 1990 and 1998. 
28 Pham et al. (2003) studied 113 Australian IPOs from 1996-1999. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
28 
Stroughton and Zechner (1998) on the other hand present underpricing as means to 
encourage monitoring and thereby reducing agency costs. A large shareholder who is 
monitoring managerial decisions could therefore be beneficial for reducing agency costs 
for all other investors as well. This is supported by Pham et al. (2003) who favour large 
shareholders as means to minimise agency costs and creating value. Large pre-IPO 
shareholders on the other hand are generally concerned about their exit possibilities 
rather than retaining control of the company. This usually leads to an increase in issue 
size and costs of the IPO (Alavi et al., 200829). 
 
These two main perspectives differ in that they use different underlying assumptions. 
Whereas Brennan and Franks (1997) made use of the fixed price mechanism as central 
foundation, Stroughton and Zechner (1998) assume the bookbuilding process as 
underlying pricing technique for IPO shares. That makes a direct comparison difficult, 
since the fixed price regime does not allow for price revision after the marketing 
process of shares began. The bookbuilding process on the other hand, allows for price 
adjustments that intend to balance supply and demand for IPO shares (Chambers and 
Dimson, 200930). 
 
Zheng and Li (200831) found evidence that underpricing is negatively related to the total 
number of shareholders, which contradicts the notion of Booth and Chua (199632). They 
found that a high level of ownership dispersion encourages underpricing, since small 
investors have to incur high information costs, which are offset by a low initial offer 
price. The main argument they support is that issuers intentionally aim to underprice 
their shares in order to encourage investors to incur information costs, which leads to 
high information, underpricing, and ownership dispersion costs (Booth and Chua, 
1996). Also Pham et al. (2003) argue in that way, stating that a higher level of 
underpricing results in a broader ownership structure. 
 
                                                
29 Alavi et al. (2008) researched 565 industrial IPOs in Australia between 1995 and 2005. 
30 Chambers and Dimson (2009) researched a sample of 4,540 IPOs during the world wars (1917-1945), 
post world war period (1946-1986), and from Big Bang until recent years (1987-2007). 
31 Zheng and Li (2008) investigated 1,179 IPO listings on NASDAQ during 1993-2000. 
32 Booth and Chua (1996) studied a sample of 2,151 IPO companies in the US during 1977-1988. 
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Further, the presence of venture capitalists (VC) has an influence on monitoring and 
control issues during the IPO process. Nonetheless, there are mixed empirical findings 
about the actual influence of VCs on underpricing (Cahine et al., 2007; Barry et al., 
1990). Engelen and Essen (2010) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) suggest that VC-
backed companies are less underpriced than non-VC firms. This is mainly caused by 
venture capitalists, who usually perform an extensive due diligence, which is assumed 
to reduce the perceived uncertainty with regards to the IPO firm. Baker and Compers 
(2003) found that founders are less likely to remain managers of the firm when the same 
is VC-backed. 
 
2.1.3.4 Behavioural explanations 
Investor behaviour and sentiment plays a central role in the pricing process of an IPO as 
well as issuer behaviour does. However, the behavioural perspective still is relatively 
unexplored and hard to measure (Ljungqvist, 2007). 
 
Behavioural explanations assume that investors are biased by their own interests and 
perceptions and thus tend to ignore excessive underpricing. The effect of investor 
sentiment on IPO pricing is particularly high, since those companies are hard to value 
because of their young, uncertain, and non-transparent nature (Ljungqvist, 2007; 
Ljungqvist et al., 2006). 
 
The theory of ´informational cascades´ developed by Welch (1992) found that investors 
joining the bidding process later sometimes disregard their own information and base 
their actual bid on those from earlier investors. It is assumed that earlier investors held 
positive information, thus making later investors believe that the investment can be 
favourable for them as well. That contradicts the partial adjustment phenomenon, which 
indicates that a high level of quality information revealed during the pricing process 
will lead to a high demand for an issue (Hanley, 1993). 
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Loughran and Ritter (2002) on the contrary, see the main impact on underpricing 
coming from behavioural biases among decision-makers within the firm. They argue 
that issuers are ready to incur large indirect costs in the form of money-left-on-the-table 
if the predicted gains from after-market price jumps are higher, which indicates a 
justification for hot issue markets. 33  There is further evidence that managers 
intentionally influence earnings or earnings forecasts to keep the offer price down in 
order to realise their own motivations and post-issuance benefits (Bessler et al., 2014). 
Nagata (201334) states that these practices of aggressive earnings management increase 
the uncertainty of value, which in turn drives price discounts. 
 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006) suggest that underwriters generally prefer marketing the issued 
shares to a small group of regular investors, which usually are institutional investors. 
This is supported by Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) as well as Cornelli and Goldreich 
(2001), who found that frequent and institutional investors are being favoured in the 
share allocation process. Empirical evidence was found that the allocation and 
marketing practices during the bookbuilding process favour institutional investors and 
thus encourage underpricing, since investors have low incentives to increase prices by 
aggressive bidding. Especially, the European market is characterized by a high level of 
regulations to avoid discretionary share allocations by banks (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2002). 
 
Even though not in the focus of this research, the behavioural explanations can be 
applied to give additional explanations when interpreting the connection of ownership 
structure and underpricing. 
 
 
                                                
33 Hot issue market as defined by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) is a period of time where there is high 
demand for IPO shares and excessively optimistic market sentiment thus leading to first-day returns 
that exceed the median first-day return for the same period. An example is the Internet Bubble of 1999-
2000. 
34 Nagata (2013) investigated 1,476 Japanese companies during 1989-2005. 
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2.2 Institutional frameworks in UK and Germany 
An institutional framework is defined as ´the systems of formal laws, regulations, and 
procedures, and informal conventions, and norms, that shape socioeconomic activity 
and behaviour´ (Wiktionary.org, 2014). It consists of both, formal (laws and 
regulations) and informal (norms and culture) institutions with the intention to reduce ex 
ante uncertainty in a corporate financial environment (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The 
term captures a large variety of possible aspects related to the IPO context and 
underpricing, but this research primarily focuses on the main findings related to the 
formal institutional framework (laws and regulations) and its implied ownership 
structure of the countries of interest, UK and Germany. Hence, the authors refer to the 
institutional framework or legal framework correspondingly from now on.   
 
The content of the introduction prospectus is subject to regulations and is the basis for a 
request for a stock exchange listing. In principle, there exist three market segments to 
list shares, mainly dependent on size and resulting special transparency requirements. 
The so called ‘Main Market’ which is regulated and designed for the listing of large 
companies, typically has the highest listing standards and costs aligned. The ‘Parallel 
Market’ for middle and small capitalisations and finally the ‘New Market’ for growth 
companies have less stringed listing requirements. However, a few exchanges in Europe 
have never started or recently closed their New Market segment including the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) the Deutsche Börse AG (DBAG). The LSE was missing a 
specific market segment for the listing of small and medium enterprises, due to the 
general acceptance of all firms at the main market regardless of size unless market 
capitalizations exceeds GBP 700.000 (approx. EUR 850.000). Since February 2013 the 
LSE has announced to launch a new ‘High Growth Segment’ in its EU-regulated Main 
Market, which was established for fast-growing firms to be included in the premium 
segment of the United Kingdom Listing Authority’s (UKLA) official list (PwC, 2013). 
The second UK IPO market segment for young companies - the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) - is unregulated and entry requirements are much lighter (Hoque, 2014). 
In Germany the two different market segments – Regulated Market (General Standard) 
and Regulated Unofficial Market (Open Market; First Quotation Board (FQB)/Second 
Quotation Board (SQB)) – are somewhat more diverse in terms of transparency levels 
within each segment (Appendix XVIII). The lowest level of transparency is required for 
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the (First) Quotation Board 35  in the Open Market, which consists of minimum 
requirements defined by EU-law, followed by the Entry Standard. In the Regulated 
Market, the minimum requirements apply to the General Standard, whereas the highest 
level for investor transparency is requested for the Prime Standard (DBAG, 2014).  
The Main markets´ most common listing requirements concern accounting records 
history, capital size and floating capitalisation. Additionally, the IPO candidate is 
obligated to provide audited accounts with three years of trading statements. 
Concerning the regulations on free float, at least 25% of the shares must be offered to 
the public in all European countries except Turkey, Spain and the Netherlands. Listing 
requirements for the Parallel Markets are very low and often no minimum market 
capitalisation is necessary and financial statements must generally provide a publication 
history of two years (Gajewski and Gresse, 2006). Appendix XVII shows the main 
listing requirements that an IPO candidate has to fulfil for the UK and Germany 
respectively. 
 
Previous research by Shi et al. (2007) found evidence that the extent of IPO 
underpricing on average is negatively associated with the strength of disclosure 
requirements and is consistent with the argument that disclosure regulation reduces 
information asymmetries and consequently leads to lower underpricing. La Porta et al. 
(2006) studies the different securities laws and finds that extensive disclosure 
requirements next to standards of liability facilitating investors recovery of losses are 
associated with a larger stock market, which is the case for the UK. Hence, the 
country’s legal origin predicts the stock market development. The author sees a benefit 
of common law since it emphasises on market discipline and private litigation through 
private contracting and standardised disclosure. The empirical findings by Shi et al. 
(2007) support that common law countries have more stringent disclosure requirements 
than do code law countries and are likely to have lower information asymmetry and 
consequently less underpricing.  
 
                                                
35 The FQB with the lowest transparency requirements was closed on 4 April 2012, after experiencing 
suspected cases of market manipulation multiple times. Stricter rules and tighter follow-up 
requirements were applied to the Entry Standard, the Open Markets transparency segment for SMEs, 
since 1 July 2012. New requirements were also applied to the Quotation Board (formerly the SQB) on 1 
October 2012.  
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The countries’ legal origin – English common law and French civil law – has been 
investigated in order to provide insights into the extent of IPOs underpricing (Cahine et 
al. 2007). The common law countries typically exhibit a higher degree of investor 
protection and have a highly developed stock market compared for instance to French 
civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The civil law system of German origin 
is placed in a middle position, but has a special role with its bank-based system 
compared to the UKs market-based system. In terms of size the UK has larger IPOs, 
that are assumed to be less risky, uncertain and hence less underpriced, than the public 
offer of less developed stock market of Germany (Georgen and Renneboog, 2007). 
 
The majority on the law and finance literature show the relationship between 
underpricing and a countries’ legal framework in the sense that a weaker legal system 
can increase the ex ante uncertainty about the firm value over and above firm-level risk 
factors. Moreover, weaker legal institutions also increase the ex ante uncertainty of the 
distribution of shares among different investors and thus force investor dilution 
(Cheung et al. 2009). Furthermore, mangers and controlling shareholders experience 
greater opportunities through transferring profits or assets (also referred to as 
´tunnelling´) out of the firm for their private benefit at the expense of less protected 
minority shareholders (Engelen and Essen, 2010). In general, weaker legal protection 
increases the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the investment, since investors are 
more uncertain about realising a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Theoretical and empirical studies support the connection between distinct legal 
frameworks and IPO underpricing though mechanism of ex ante uncertainty (Engelen 
and Essen, 2010). Therefore, one would expect IPOs of firms operating in the UK with 
better legal protection, to have lower level of underpricing (Table 1).  
 
Furthermore, the British institutional system is described as an active market of 
corporate control and a focus on shareholder value with the popularity of institutional 
well-protected investors. The German blockholder-based system on the other hand is 
characterised by a strong control concentration and complex pyramidal ownership 
structure in which bank finance is more prevalent (Georgen and Renneboog, 2007). As 
banks often follow their own agenda in maximising their market value, arising agency 
conflicts seem logic. Especially for the German universal banking system in which 
financial institutions traditionally hold equity stake in firms and provide underwriter 
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services might be affected by conflicts of interest arising from these relationships 
(Bessler and Kurth, 2007). At the same time underwriters in the UK enjoy great 
influence in setting the issue price, while investment banks became more powerful, 
makes the relationships between underwriter/investors/issuers with evolving conflicts 
interesting i.e. agency conflicts (Chambers and Dimson, 2009).  
 
Together with the underwriters discretion for allocating shares and thereby influencing 
the degree of dispersion of shareholder distribution leads to another recent topic in IPO 
underpricing the ownership structure and control that are also determined by a countries 
legal origin. The UK – common law – is characterised with a more dispersed ownership 
structure, whereas Germany – civil law – is considered to have a more concentrated 
ownership structure. Pham et al. (2003) shows that these two dimensions of ownership 
structure, breadth and equality of shareholder distribution are influenced by 
underpricing. Several studies claim that it is crucial to an issues success to attract not 
only large investors, but also a certain proportion of small, less informed investors 
(Rock, 1986; Michaely and Shaw, 1994). Theories of underpricing in the sense of 
influencing shareholder distribution is promoted, since uninformed investors will not be 
induced to participate otherwise and higher underpricing is hence, associated with a 
more diverse shareholder base i.e. wider breadth (Michaely and Shaw, 1994). 
Alternatively, Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that underpricing allows the owners to 
discriminate larger investors throughout the allocation process in order to protect 
companies’ insiders and remain in control.  Contrary, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) 
suggest that large applicants are more likely to be prioritised, since it is the issuers need 
to induce the best-informed investors to reveal their information.  
 
The different objectives of domestic firms in terms of ownership structure and control 
through the allocation of new shares play an important role in the underpricing of IPOs. 
The UK tends to favour small investors, and higher underpricing induces participation 
from a larger number of new investors and thus promotes a wider breadth (Pham et al., 
s2003). Furthermore, underpricing gives the issuer permission to discriminate against 
larger applicants to ensure greater dispersion. On the other hand, for German companies 
that favour more concentrated ownership and larger shareholders a lower level of 
underpricing is required to achieve full allocation for the typically better informed 
investors that are compensated with a higher proportion for the less underpriced IPO 
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and lower agency costs due to better monitoring (Pham et al., 2003). This is also in 
contrast to the argument of weaker legal protection – for German civil law – and higher 
level of underpricing.  
 
2.3 Summary of previous literature 
Although it is a costly process and associated with additional obligations, the main 
reason for companies to go public is the access to funds at the capital market (Ellingsen 
and Rydqvist, 1997; Ritter 1987; Barry et al., 1991). Nowadays, the most commonly 
used pricing process in European IPOs is the bookbuilding mechanism (Biais and 
Faugeron, 2002; Sherman, 2004; Ljungqvist et al., 2003). Researchers believe that this 
mechanism allows for a more accurate pricing of IPO shares than traditional methods, 
i.e. fixed price offerings (Ritter, 1988; Loughran et al., 1994; Jenkinson and Jones, 
2004; Ljungvist, 2003). Nonetheless, underpricing never disappeared and is severe as 
ever. In recent years the European market in particular established hybrid pricing 
mechanisms which combine the bookbuilding with traditional approaches and 
distinguish informed and uninformed investors (Jagannathan and Sherman, 2006; 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002). 
 
Until today most of the literature analysed information frictions and agency problems as 
main influencing factors of underpricing (Rock, 1986; Cahine et al., 2007; Günther and 
Rummer, 2006; Ritter and Welch, 2002; among others). The most established and well 
known theories are Rock´s (1986) winners curse (i.e. underpricing as means to create 
sufficient demand and attract uninformed investors) and the signalling model (i.e. 
underpricing as means to indicate a good firm quality) (Welch, 1989, Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; among others). 
 
Other influencing factors for share pricing are IPO process participant sentiment and 
strategy (behavioural explanation). This viewpoint investigates possible decision biases 
of investors, underwriters, and firms. The informational cascade theory in this context is 
the most established and states that subsequent investors might disregard their own 
information and base their bids on opinions of previous bidders (Welch, 1992). Other 
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theories like aggressive earnings management to keep share prices low (Nagata, 2013; 
Bessler et al., 2014) have not yet been confirmed by many empirical studies. The 
general practice that underwriters seem to prefer their regular and institutional investors 
when marketing the IPO shares on the other hand is a more established theory (Hanley 
and Wilhelm, 1995; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). 
 
Since early investigators like Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984), and Rock (1986) 
detected the underpricing phenomenon when companies go public, a comprehensive 
body of research has been established. Although first day returns have been studied 
extensively during the past decades there still are controversial opinions and empirical 
findings, especially in cross-country perspectives. 
 
There has been less research on institutional explanations for the undepricing 
phenomenon. The lawsuit avoidance theory, which assumes underpricing as means to 
reduce the probability of future legal liabilities (Logue, 1973; Ibbotson, 1975; Hughes 
and Thakor, 1992; Tinic, 1988) only finds mixed support in a cross-country perspective. 
Underpricing was also studied as ownership and control argument as it enables the 
issuing firm to create an excess demand and higher dispersion of ownership (Brennan 
and Franks, 1997; Boulton et al., 2010; Smart and Zutter, 2003; Booth and Chua, 1996; 
Pham et al., 2003). This implies that common law countries, characterised by a high 
dispersion of ownership, should be more underpriced. Empirical evidence suggests the 
opposite and usually found civil law structures being more underpriced (Shi et al., 
2007; Cahine et al., 2007; Engelen and Essen, 2010; Boulton et al., 2009; Hopp and 
Dreher, 2007). This is mainly supported by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2002, 2006) 
who argument that a common law structures are associated with a high level of 
shareholder protection and thus create less uncertainty for investors, which in turn leads 
to a low level of underpricing. 
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2.4 Hypotheses development 
Hypotheses are constructed using previous literature and thus ensuring a high level of 
comparability. H0 represents the null hypothesis assuming that the variables tested are 
equal to zero. Otherwise, the alternative hypothesis H1 assumes a significant difference 
from zero. The t-statistics is applied to reject or not reject the null hypotheses, when 
empirically tested.  
 
As mentioned previously, the UK and Germany belong to different legal origins. It is 
well known that the legal system and performance of capital markets are closely related 
(Boulton et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1998, 1997, 2002). This research therefore aims to 
find out if there is a relationship between the level of underpricing and the difference in 
the legal origin. There is mixed evidence for the relation of underpricing to the 
institutional framework and the implied ownership structure. Some researchers argue 
that company insiders use underpricing as means to create a high level of ownership 
dispersion (i.e. a characteristic of common law countries) to retain control (Brennan and 
Franks, 1997; Smart and Zutter, 2003). Other empirical evidence focusing on 
uncertainty related to the IPO process, suggest that a higher minority shareholder 
protection (i.e. in common law countries) is related to a lower level of underpricing 
(Hopp and Dreher, 2007; Shi et al., 2007). The researcher assumes that this might be 
reversed in the context of the crisis since La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) found evidence 
that civil law structures create less uncertainty in times of economic downturn. The 
following general hypothesis is developed in order to test if the general level of 
underpricing is significantly different in the UK as a common law country than in 
Germany as a civil law country. 
 
 
H0a: The legal origin has no influence on IPO underpricing. !!:!!!"#_!" = !0 
 
H1a: The level of IPO underpricing in the UK, a common law country, is 
significantly different than in Germany, a civil law country. !!:!!!"#_!" ≠ 0 
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To go further into detail and investigate the influence of the specific characteristics of 
the different legal frameworks on the level of underpricing, two other hypotheses are 
tested. Engelen and Essen (2010) established legal enforcement (LE) and quality of 
legal framework (QLF) variables to test for such influences, which are used in this 
study a well. A negative correlation was found for both of the variables and 
underpricing (Engelen and Essen, 2010; Shi et al., 2007). There is further evidence that 
companies in common law countries, characterized by a high level of legal enforcement 
and good quality of legal system, are more underpriced than firms in civil law structures 
(Brennan and Franks, 1997; Boulton et al., 2010; Smart and Zutter, 2003). Nonetheless, 
when looking at the post crisis period it is assumed that a positive relationship will be 
found, relying on La Porta et al. (1998, 1997) who state that civil law structures work 
better in times of crisis for the reason that companies have lower debt levels. Common 
law countries on the other hand seem to be more advantageous in economic upturns, 
because growth is achieved through high debt levels. This would indicate that the level 
of uncertainty in civil law countries is lower than in common law countries in times of 
crisis. 
 
 H0b: The level of LE has no influence on the level of underpricing. !!:!!!" = !0 
 
 H1b: The level of LE has a significant influence on the level of 
underpricing. !!:!!!" ≠ 0 
 
  
H0c: The QLF has no influence on the level of underpricing. !!:!!!"# = !0 
 
H1c: The QLF has a significant influence on the level of underpricing. !!:!!!"# ≠ 0 
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Pham et al. (2003) detected empirical evidence that a larger number of investors (higher 
ownership breadth) is related to a higher level of underpricing. Hence, the same 
research discovered that a high inequality of shareholder distribution (mirrored by a 
large proportion of blockholders) induces a low level of underpricing. This is supported 
by Brennan and Franks (1997) and Boulton et al. (2010) who found that underpricing 
can be used as means to reduce the number of block shareholders. Some other empirical 
studies found that underpricing is positively related to ownership dispersion as well 
(Booth and Chua, 1996; Brennan and Franks, 1997; Boulton et al., 2010; Smart and 
Zutter, 2003). Based on these perspectives the following hypotheses are established to 
find if there is a significant relationship between the level of underpricing and 
ownership breadth as well as inequality of shareholder distribution. 
 
H0d: The ownership breadth does not influence the level of underpricing. 
 !!:!!!" = !0 
 
H1d: The higher the ownership breadth, the higher the level of underpricing. !!:!!!" > 0 
 
H0e: The inequality of shareholder distribution does not influence the level of 
underpricing. !!:!!!"#$% = !0 
 
H1e: The higher the inequality of shareholder distribution the lower the level of 
underpricing. !!:!!!"#$% < 0 
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Table 3 outlines the authors’ expected correlations to underpricing with regards to the 
developed hypotheses.  
 
Table 3: Hypotheses Overview 
Variables  UPR 
Country-level  
 Common law DV +/- 
  
 Quality of legal framework - 
Legal enforcement - 
  
 Firm-level 
 Shareholder Breadth:  
SB + 
Shareholder Inequality: 
 BLOCK - 
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3 Methodology and data 
This research utilises the Saunders et al. (2009)´Research Onion´ approach to establish 
the methodological framework. The onion consists of different layers describing the 
underlying philosophy, approach, strategy and specific techniques of the research, 
which is further explained in this chapter. Additionally, the data collection process, 
sampling approach, regression model and delimitations of the research are introduced. 
Finally, the chapter concludes analogue to Brooks (2008), with a test of reliability and 
validity of the regression results to ensure the quality of data presented. 
 
3.1 Research philosophy, approach, and strategy 
The project follows a positivist research philosophy, focusing on hypothesis testing. 
These hypotheses are built using previous empirical findings and existing theories to 
either approve or reject the same for the specific sample of UK and German IPOs in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. It will be particularly interesting if the existing theories 
hold true for this period of time since the crisis induced major changes in legislation and 
behaviour of participants in the IPO process. The positivist philosophy is particularly 
suitable due to the fact that the study focuses on facts and observations rather than 
personal impressions or opinions of the researcher. It is further supporting the usage of 
quantitative numerical data. This also implies a deductive research approach, utilising 
theoretical findings to establish the reasoning for the specific sample. This so-called 
´top-down´ approach allows for logical conclusions resulting from existing theories and 
an objective interpretation of data (Greener, 2008; Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
An experiment strategy is used to select appropriate samples from the known population 
of IPOs in the UK and Germany during 2009 to 2013. To do so a mono method 
quantitative data collection technique is applied, since raw data is mainly gathered from 
the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ database and is statistically analysed. A 
linear multiple regression model using cross-sectional data for all firms that went public 
during the chosen time frame is applied. The time horizon is set to five years (2009-
2013) which implies a longitudinal study approach, investigating the underpricing 
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phenomenon over a period of time. Since a causal relationship between certain 
numerical variables is investigated, this study is termed as explanatory (Greener, 2008; 
Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
3.2.1 Data Set 
In this study the probability of each company being chosen from the data set is known, 
thus probability sampling is utilised, which is also the most commonly used sampling 
technique for experimental research. It is also called representative sampling since it 
considers a complete population and allows for statistically relevant investigations 
(Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
For this research 252 new IPO admissions in the UK market and 62 in the German 
market during 2009-2013 are investigated. The data set is divided into two portfolios of 
German and UK firms, which allow for a direct comparison. Nonetheless, the 
significantly smaller German sample size has to be considered when analysing data. 
Non-domestic firms that were listed on the respective stock exchanges, are only 
included in the sample when headquarters are located in the countries of interest, since 
the purpose of this project is to investigate the underpricing phenomenon for UK and 
German firms only. Companies that were delisted and private placements (pp) within 
the given period of time are not included in the analysis. This is a potential for 
misspecification known as the survival-related bias that occurs when failing firms are 
not included in the sample (Pukthuanthong et al., 2007). Nonetheless, this is not 
assumed to lead to biases in the regression result, since the number of firms is marginal 
and the problem more relevant when a long-run behaviour of IPOs is considered.  
 
Based on the data available and missing values that could be added manually a 
noticeable adjustment to the sample regarding the UK in 2013 is conducted by the 
authors. Due to lacking data regarding the ownership information for the most recent36 
IPOs the sample reduced by another 27 firms for the UK. To replace the missing values 
by an alternative approximation seems not suitable and arbitrary for the respective 
                                                
36 This affects IPOs from the end of year 2013 from which no annual reports or such is available yet.  
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characteristic of a firm’s ownership structure. Previous studies often exclude Penny 
Stocks37, but due to the high number of such shares in this sample they are included in 
the analysis. However, because of their highly speculative nature the presence of these 
stocks in large numbers can be an explanation of the high level of variability of the 
sample. After analysing the information provided, a final sample of 177 (138 UK and 
39 German) companies is selected. 
 
Missing data, which could not be found using the S&P Capital IQ database is retrieved 
and corrected manually by using other reliable secondary sources, like publications 
from DBAG and LSE as well as respective annual reports of IPO companies. To avoid 
inconsistencies, years with missing financial data and negative share price and asset 
values are eliminated and not included in the study. 
 
The sample is distributed of the years 2009-2013 as shown in the table below. 
Table 4: Sample distribution of IPOs across UK and GER 
Sample distribution across years:               
Year 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  Total  
Country N UPR* N UPR N UPR N UPR N UPR N UPR 
UK 13 9% 42 5% 32 16% 27 13% 24 14% 39 3% 
GER 2 2% 10 4% 13 0% 8 -2% 6 4% 138 16% 
Total 15 6% 52 5% 45 8% 35 6% 30 9% 177 9% 
* Mean underpricing in percentage.                    
(Source: created by authors) 
 
3.2.2 Sample Source 
Main source for previous literature and empirical research on the topic is the Lund 
University Library database, which provides access to comprehensive directories such 
as Science Direct and Emerald. Articles were mainly retrieved from the two reputable 
periodicals; Journal of Finance and Journal of Financial Economics.  
 
                                                
37 Penny Stocks are characterized by having an offering price, which is below a certain threshold (usually 
€1) and are very speculative investments.  
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IPO and company data is primarily retrieved from the S&P Capital IQ database, which 
offers condensed and standardised financial statement information and additional 
insights into the specific companies and IPO deals of the sample. That enables the 
researchers to efficiently and rationally analyse the complete set of UK and German 
IPO admissions in the limited time frame of this study. UK numerical data is converted 
from GBP to EUR at historical monthly exchange rates to enable a realistic comparison 
of both samples. This is considered to be a potential source of biases in the findings and 
could further inhibit the accuracy of data presented. 
 
Information about de-listing, and missing historical data (e.g. price per share, ownership 
structures) is retrieved from the respective annual reports of the companies, DBAG, and 
LSE websites. When matching the data gathered with these other sources, minor 
deviations of information are found. This is a potential source for variances of the 
empirical results when comparing them to other research studies. 
 
The indices considered in the analysis are taken from previous literature and thus might 
not be applicable to the investigated period since the financial crisis had a large impact 
on laws and regulations 
  
3.3 Regression 
Based on the above explained data sample, the relationship between the response 
variable underpricing and the firm-specific and country-specific explanatory variables 
that reveal the impact of institutional frameworks across a countries legal origin, is 
tested in a multiple linear regression model. The regression model and the definition of 
the respective variables are specified. Finally, the tests and techniques undertaken to 
ensure the robustness of the model and results are described. 
 
3.3.1 The regression model 
The study performs an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model for the final data 
sample of the 177 IPOs from both countries – UK and GER - that went public between 
2009-2013. The sample misses some cross-sectional elements observations and it is 
therefore highly important to test the data material, whether the underlying assumptions 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
45 
for a linear regression model hold, to secure significant test results. Especially, 
violations of OLS assumptions that cause heteroscedasticity or non-normality, but also 
other problems like multicollinearity need to be checked and ideally solved. Table 7 
illustrates the underlying assumptions and how to test for the desirable properties of the 
OLS estimator that is consistent, unbiased and efficient (Brooks, 2008). 
 
To examine the relationship between underpricing and institutional factors, as well as 
ownership structure, as typical features of a countries legal origin (legal system), the 
model is specified as follows. Various factors that have proven to affect IPO 
underpricing both firm-specific risk factors and the country-specific risk factors as 
control variables are included in the regression.  
 
The regression model for the determinants of IPO underpricing across countries and 
firms is consequently:   
  Equation 1: Regression Model       
!"#$%&%'('")!" = ! + !!!!"# + !!!!!!!!!!! !!"# + !!" 
    
            
where underpricingij is the percentage return of firm  i, which denotes cross-section unit 
(i.e. IPOs), in country j38. The notations Cmij illustrate country-specific factors, whereas 
Fnij control for firm-specific factors and εij denotes the error term. 
 
In the basic equation 1 the authors control for general country- and firm-specific factors 
that have most frequently been used and that are not directly attributable to one of the 
hypotheses. Therefore, the variables allocated to the five hypotheses are classified and 
added to the basic equation and follow a general-to-specific approach. 
 
Equation 1 is estimated using a pooled sample of 177 IPOs from the two countries on a 
firm level, which is consistent with earlier cross-country studies like Shi et al. (2007), 
and offers several advantages over the country-level specification. The firm level 
                                                
38 Time subscript omitted. 
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analysis captures more information about the IPO dataset, like the fact that IPO 
underpricing varies not only across countries but also within countries and over time. 
Hence, this approach allows controlling for both variations in the dependent variable of 
underpricingij directly. Moreover, the smaller number of observations and empirical 
evidence of industry and time-series effects on IPO underpricing cannot be included in 
a country-level analysis. However, a potential drawback of this approach worth 
considering during the analysis is the unwarranted weighting to the country with a 
larger number of IPOs that is the UK in this case (Shi et al., 2007).  
 
All statistical tests are conducted with the EViews software, Version 8. 
 
3.3.2 Response Variable 
Consistent with previous research on this topic (Pham et al., 2003; Beatty and Ritter, 
1986; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Engelen and Essen, 2010; Rock, 1986, Ibbotson and 
Jaffe, 1975; Shi et al, 2007, among others) the most relevant indicator for underpricing 
(UPR) is the initial return, which is calculated as difference of first day closing and 
offer price as proportion of the offer price: 
   
Equation 2: Underpricing !"# = ! (!"#$%!!"#!!"#$%&'!!"#$%!!""#$!!"#$%)!""#$!!!"#$!    
 
Underpricing is always used as the dependent variable in the hypotheses testing process. 
Since the research aims at investigating various influencing factors on the level of 
underpricing. 
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3.3.3 Explanatory Variables 
Following the hypotheses development, the firm specific and the country-specific 
factors will be defined according to their classification of either hypotheses or control 
variables.  
 
3.3.3.1 Country-specific risk factors 
To investigate the cross-country differences and measure the quality of institutional 
factors on underpricing, variables such as legal origin, legal enforcement, and a measure 
of the general quality of the legal framework are used to test the proposed hypotheses. 
 
Legal origin 
The legal origin can influence the level of underpricing in respective countries (La Porta 
et al., 1998, 2006; Engelen and Essen, 2010). In general it is found that the common 
law origin is negatively related to underpricing. This is mainly due to the fact that 
minority shareholder are favoured by laws and regulation, and thus uncertainty is 
reduced, which in turn requires less underpricing (La Porta et al., 1998; Engelen and 
Essen, 2010; Shi et al., 2007; Hopp and Dreher, 2007). To test the first general 
hypothesis the Common Law Dummy (COM_DV) variable and its influence on the 
level of underpricing is tested. The values are the following: 
 
0 – GER civil law structure 
1 – UK common law structure 
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Law enforcement 
Law enforcement consists of three index numbers namely, Disclosure Requirements 
(DISC), Liability Standards (LIAB), and Public Enforcement (PUB) index. The 
numbers are taken from the La Porta et al. (2006) research (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Law enforcement index numbers 
 Disclosure 
Requirements 
Liability 
Standard 
Public 
Enforcement 
Germany 0.42 0.00 0.22 
United Kingdom 0.83 0.66 0.68 
(Source: La Porta et al. 2006) 
 
Shi et al. (2007) found the disclosure index being negatively related and liability 
standard and public enforcement being positively related to underpricing. Engelen and 
Essen (2010) on the other hand found that a higher public enforcement index has a 
negative influence on underpricing. 
 
Quality of legal framework 
The quality of the legal framework includes two main variables, namely Rule of Law 
(ROL) and Corruption (COR). As suggested by Shi et al. (2007) and Engelen and Essen 
(2010) the ROL index numbers of the La Porta et al. (1998) are used. In addition to that 
the annual corruption index numbers are taken from the Transparency International 
(2014) research body.  
 
The corruption index is measured on a scale from zero to one, where a lower value 
means higher corruption. It indicates the corruption in government, i.e. politicians 
accepting illegal payments, bribe connected to licenses, taxes etc. Hence, it provides a 
measure of how public power is used to gain private benefits. The Rule of Law on the 
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other hand mirrors the tradition of laws and orders. It is also measured on a scale from 
zero to one, where lower scores indicate less tradition for law and order (La Porta et al., 
1998).  
 
Table 6: Quality of legal framework index numbers 
 Rule of Law Annual Corruption Index 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Germany 0,923 0.125 0.127 0.125 0.127 0.128 
United Kingdom 0.857 0.130 0.132 0.128 0.135 0.132 
(Source: La Porta et al., 2006; Transparency International, 2014) 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Firm-specific risk factors 
To assess the impact of ownership structure as indicators for a countries’ legal origin on 
underpricing firm-specific variables are introduced.  
 
Since shareholders are not a homogeneous group and the distribution of size of share 
holdings can vary largely it is hard to measure the ownership structure with one variable 
(Pham et al., 2003). Pham et al. (2003) use breadth and equality of shareholder 
distribution as determinants of ownership structure which seems intuitively appealing. 
 
Shareholder breadth 
Breadth of shareholder distribution as defined by Pham at al. (2003): size and diversity 
of outside investors and the IPO share allocation; number of new investors divided by 
value of issued shares. In contrast to most previous studies this study takes the original 
owners and their retained shares into consideration. Pension funds are considered as 
institutional owners. 
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 Shareholder breadth, adjusted for size differences can be calculated as follows: 
 
Equation 3: Shareholder Breadth 
 
 !" = !!!"#$!!!"#!!"!!"#$%&'(%! "#!!!"##!!!!"!!%! "#$%&!!"!"#$%!!"!!!!"#$!!""#$#%  
 
Shareholder inequality 
However, the above-mentioned ratio does not mirror the actual distribution of 
shareholders and concentration of ownership. To show the varying types of investors 
two other variables, indicating the inequality of shareholder distribution are developed. 
The S&P IQ Capital software offers data for different shareholding groups, namely 
institutional (including banks and pension funds), individual/insider, family offices and 
trusts, VC/Private Equity firms, and CEO ownership. To ensure the robustness of 
results this study is categorised shareholders into two groups: large and block. A 
shareholder who holds 100,000 and more shares is herein considered as ´large´. 
Additionally, investors holding more than 5% of the issued stocks are considered as 
´blockholder´ (Wruck, 1989; Pham et al. 2003).  
 
Equation 4: Large Shareholders 
!"#$% = ! !ℎ!"#$!ℎ!"#!!"!!"#$%&'(%!!"#$#%! "#$!!ℎ!"!100,000!!ℎ!"#$!"!!"!!"#$%&!!"!!ℎ!"#$!!""#$%  
 
Equation 5: Blockholder 
!"#$% = ! !ℎ!"#$!ℎ!"#!!"!!"#$%&'(%!!"#$#%! "#$!!ℎ!"!5%!!"!!ℎ!"#$!"!#$!!"#$%&!!"!!ℎ!"#$!!""#$%  
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The variable LARGE is added as a dummy variable to the regression, due to the 
similarity to the BLOCK variable. These measures ensure a certain robustness of the 
presented findings, but also lead to potential limitations since they are mostly sensitive 
to changes in major shareholdings, but ignore variations in the remainder of shareholder 
distribution (Pham et al., 2003).  
 
3.3.3.3 Control variables 
To control for ex ante uncertainty the age of the firm is used, which is found to be 
negatively correlated to the level of underpricing by Ritter (1984), Cahine (2008), and 
Loughran and Ritter (2004). A VC-dummy variable is further utilised, since evidence 
was found such that the presence of VCs can reduce the level of underpricing (Engelen 
and Essen, 2010; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Suchard, 2009). The annual IPO volume 
is also taken into consideration, since the number of IPOs fluctuates over time and can 
vary immensely in times of economic bubbles and years following a crisis (Shi et al., 
2007; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). 
The debt level is included in the analysis, since La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) connect the 
civil law structure with a lower debt level and therefore lower uncertainty, particularly 
in times of economic downturns (Shi et al., 2007).  
 
The firm size is assumed to be associated with the proceed size of the issue. Consistent 
with Shi et al. (2007) the logarithm of issue proceeds is used as variable indicating the 
firm size. As larger firms are assumed to be less risky and hence less underpriced a 
negative correlation of a firms proceeds with respect to the degree of IPO underpricing 
can be expected (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Shi et al., 2007). The logarithmic 
transformation is conducted in order to improve the variables normal distribution and 
increase the fit to the dependent variable. Moreover, Engelen and Essen (2010) suggest 
including the price earnings (P/E) ratio as control variable, which seems intuitively 
suitable for this analysis as well. It indicates the level of ex ante uncertainty involved in 
the IPO. It is calculated as the share price divided by EPS, where EPS equals net 
income divided by number of shares outstanding.  
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The empirical literature also finds evidence that information asymmetry tends to be 
similar within industries and makes use of an industry dummy variable to control for the 
riskiness of the firm (Ljungqvist et al. 2003, Loughran and Ritter, 2004). In general 
high-tech and internet firms are assumed to be more risky than other non-technological 
industries and therefore have a higher level of underpricing (Engelen and Essen, 2010; 
Benveniste et al., 2003; Lin et al., 2013). The researchers decided to introduce an 
additional recession dummy variable to control for the influence of the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis in 2009 since it is believed that that year might be severely 
different from the others. The year 2009 is classified as a recession year, where the level 
of IPO underpricing was at a low point (Pwc, 2012). An equity market size proxy using 
the respective company market capitalisation is utilised to control for the quality of the 
stock markets. La Porta et al. (2006) and Shi et al. (2007) suggest that the equity market 
size is related to higher quality disclosure and lower information asymmetry, resulting 
in a lower level of underpricing. 
 
A detailed description of each investigated variable and the respective source can be 
found in Appendix XV.  
 
3.3.4 Reliability and validity of regression results 
The pooled multiple regressions are run to test the influence of the explanatory 
variables on underpricingij. The regression t-statistic as a test of significance is used to 
test a single hypothesis i.e. hypotheses involving only one coefficient 39(!!:!! =0; !!! ≠ 0). Especially, some missing observations in the data are a potential problem 
for linear multiple regressions, and thus the reliability of the estimation results must be 
ensured by the fulfilment of the underlying OLS assumptions.  
 
 
                                                
39 H0 is the Hypothesis that is actually tested, whereas H1 represents the remaining outcomes (alternative) 
of interest. 
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Table 7: OLS Assumptions and other potential problems 
OLS Assumptions Interpretation Test 
1: E (ut) = 0 The errors have zero mean no test needed 
2: Var (ut) = σ2< ∞ 
The variance of the errors is constant 
(homoscedasticity) 
Graphical method; Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, 
Goldfeld-Quandt, White's, etc. 
3: Cov (ui,uj) = 0 
The covariance between the errors (cross-sectional) 
equal zero i.e. uncorrelated with one another Breusch-Godfrey test; Durban-Watson test 
4: Cov (ui, xi) = 0 
The xt are non-stochastic; There is no relationship 
between the error and corresponding x variable Hausman test 
5: ut – N (0,σ2) The disturbances are normally distributed Bera-Jarque test 
Implicit Assumptions 
 
Multicollinearity 
Explanatory variables are very highly correlated 
with each other Correlation matrix 
Non-linearity 
Relationship between x and y expected to be 
approx. linear Scatterplots; Ramsey RESET test 
Parameter stability 
Parameters (beta's) are constant for the entire 
sample period Recursive estimation (plot) 
   Causes of endogeneity (see Assumption 4) 
Omitted Variables 
Leaving out some explanatory variables 
 that should be included 
 Simultaneity Reverse causality 
 Measurement Error 
  
Selection Bias 
Non-random assignment to 
two groups (treatment and control) 
 
(Source: Brooks, 2008) 
 
OLS Assumptions 
For the first assumption that the errors have zero means no test is needed. With a 
constant term (c) in the regression equation this requirement will never be violated. A 
violation of Assumption 3 for a zero covariance between disturbance terms cross-
sectionally is rather intuitive for time-series data, but the possibility of autocorrelation is 
not common in a cross-sectional context40. The test for autocorrelation in this case is 
rather more complex and a straightforward remedy for autocorrelation is to use the 
Newey-West option in the model that produces standard errors (SE) that correct for 
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. However, the results for the variables of 
                                                
40 The cross-sectional autocorrelation occurs when the residuals from the IPOs from one country may be 
correlated. 
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interest of the OLS regression remain consistent when using the Newey-West robust SE 
(Appendix XI) thus indicates that the data is not affected by autocorrelation.  
 
The second assumption of homoscedasticity is that the variance of the errors is constant, 
otherwise they are said to be heteroscedastic and no longer have the minimum variance 
among the class of unbiased estimates. The White’s heteroscedasticity test output from 
the  (Appendix VIII), where the auxiliary regression of the squared residuals are run, 
indicates an ambiguous conclusion here. Both the F- and χ2 do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the errors are homoscedastic (!! = !!! = 0,!! = 0,… ,!! = 0) with p-
values that are in excess of the critical 0,05 value. On the other hand the ‘Scaled 
explained SS’ suggests that there is evidence (p-value 0,00) of heteroscedasticity. To 
avoid any incorrect SE and/or hypotheses tests, all models are conducted using the 
White’s modified ‘robust’ or heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error estimates (in 
Eviews).  
 
Assumption 4 is that the xt are non-stochastic, but only provide specified OLS estimates 
when the repressors are not correlated with the error term. If the assumption of no 
relationship between the error and the corresponding x variate is violated, resulting in 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates is defined as endogeneity. Causes of 
endogeneity among the repressors and according to Lin et al. (2013) a common 
limitation of cross-country studies through possibly omitted (correlated) variables. The 
simulateneity bias or in other words reverse causality is diluted, since the variables 
regarding the institutional framework are chosen in a country-level, not on a firm level. 
First, it is necessary to test for endogeneity among the independent variables by 
conducting a Hausman test manually. Therefore, the dependent variable underpricingij 
is regressed on the fitted values/residuals as additional explanatory variables. The fitted 
values/residuals are highly significant (p-value 0.00) (Appendix IX) and thus the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity41 is rejected. The significant endogeneity means that other 
factors not captured in the equation influence the dependent variable underpricingij. A 
standard econometric remedy to deal with endogeneity, that is consistent to earlier 
research methodology (Lin et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2007), is to rely on exogenous 
variation by an instrumental variable (IV) approach (Two-Stage-Least-Square (2SLS)) 
                                                
41 H0 that the coefficients of the fitted values equal zero. 
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and/or include additional control variables. The main difficulty with IV/2SLS is to find 
a valid instrument, thereby to risk the consequence that non-exogenous and/or weak 
instruments cause unreliable parameter estimates. Additionally, the IVs used by Lin et 
al. (2013) and Shi et al. (2007) – such as common law dummy variable, public 
enforcement index or rule of law index – are already included as explanatory variables 
in the regression model. Thus, the 2SLS approach is not applied, but the inclusion of an 
additional control variable (P/E ratio) is used to address the problem of endogeneity. 
 
In order to conduct single or joint hypotheses tests about the model parameters the fifths 
assumption that the disturbances are normally distributed is required (Table 7). To 
ensure a normally distributed (ut∼N(0, σ2)) sample, the authors conducted the most 
commonly applied test, the Bera-Jarque (BJ) test. The BJ tests whether the coefficient 
of skewness (b1) and the excess kurtosis (b2 – 3) are jointly zero with the following test 
statistic:  
Equation 6: Bera – Jarque test-statistics 
 !" = ! !!! !!! + !!! !!! ~!!! 2       
 
Appendix X shows the test results for the final data sample together with a graphical 
method that shows a histogram plot of the residuals. The test statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed in other words that the series is 
symmetric and mesokurtic. One approach to deal with non-normality that is consistent 
with Brooks (2008), who suggests to draw a graph of the residuals and remove the 
observations that do not fit in with the pattern of the remainder of the data known as 
outliers, is adopted. Therefore, three IPOs of the UK and one from the German sample 
that showed extreme positive first day returns (exceeding 200%) are removed. For 
sample sizes that are sufficiently large the central limit theorem42 holds and violations of 
the normality assumptions are irrelevant. This seems less applicable for the given 
sample size in this data set, and consequently the OLS coefficient estimates of the 
findings might be unreliable and cannot be precisely interpreted. The authors are aware 
                                                
42 The central limit theorem states that the sample mean converges to a normal distribution (Brooks, 
2008). 
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of these circumstances and consider the shortcomings when interpreting and concluding 
the results of the findings.  
 
The implicit assumptions of an appropriate OLS estimation are adopting the right 
functional form43 or parameter stability in the regression model that needs to be taken 
into account. As the Ramsey Reset test regarding the first is a general test for 
Regression Specification Error and does not suggest any better specification, it is 
addressed by the remedies applied to the present errors of potentially omitted variables 
and endogeneity, whereas the parameters are assumed to be linear. The latter is based 
on recursive estimation and the plot of both the recursive residuals and the CUSUM 
Test. The lines illustrated in Appendix XII and XIII are well within the coefficient 
bands and it can be concluded the null hypothesis of stability is not rejected.  
 
In order to improve the results further, a number of dummy variables that are described 
above, are introduced consistent with the IPO underpricing research body. To address 
the problem of seasonality and correct for time-varying levels of underpricing year 
dummy variables for each year – YEAR_DV – are included (for example Loughran and 
Ritter, 2004; Lin et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2007). Apart from the other year dummies, the 
year 2009 is labelled differently as RECESSION_DV, due to its significance at a 5% 
level. An industry dummy variable – INDUSTRY_DV – is introduced to control for 
industry variations in underpricing. The firms that fall into one of the two categories of 
high-tech and Internet firms are captured in the industry dummy variable. Finally, a 
dummy variable for venture-backed IPO – VC_DV – is included in the regression. 
The regression results are summarized in Appendix II.  
 
Robustness tests  
Omitted Variables  
As mentioned above the problem of potentially Omitted Variables is addressed by 
including the price earnings (P/E) ratio – PE – as an additional control variable. Chen et 
al. (2004) state that firms with a lot of growth opportunities, causing an increased risk 
and uncertainty about the investment that are characterized with a higher P/E ratio. As a 
result a positive relationship between a high P/E ratio and thus higher levels of 
                                                
43 A violation or wrong functional form implies non-linearity in the parameters.  
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underpricing can be expected and confirmed empirically by Engelen (2003). Even 
though the coefficient estimate shown in Appendix II for the P/E ratio is not significant 
and would not allow a reliable interpretation, the trend is in line with previous results of 
a positive relationship. However, the overall regression results for the variables 
regarding hypotheses tests remain unchanged and the goodness of fit (R2) only changes 
marginal by 0,0001 (Appendix VII).   
 
Multicollinearity 
The problem of Multicollinearity for OLS estimation if the explanatory variables are 
correlated with one another, is especially well known for country-level variables. 
Appendix I contains a correlation matrix44 that shows that all of the indices for the 
quality of a countries legal framework and legal enforcement are perfectly collinear 
(1.00/-1,00). This seems intuitive, when having constant index numbers for only two 
countries, and thus having insufficient variety. An ad hoc solution for dealing with the 
existence of multicollienearity is to drop one of the collinear variables (Brooks, 2008). 
Therefore, only the two variables of interest for legal enforcement – ROL_index and 
COR_index – are included in Equation 1 and the results can be applied to the other 
index variables, due to the perfect collinearity. Nonetheless, to test this assumption one 
variable of the legal enforcement – PUB_index – is added separately to the regression 
and supports the proposed relationship (Table 3, Appendix II). The firm-level variables 
do not suffer from collinear data as the correlation matrix visualizes (Appendix I). 
 
An alternative and common estimation technique (see for example La Porta et al. 2006; 
Shi et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2013) in the presence of multicollinearity is to perform a 
principal component analysis (PCA). The applicability of the principal components 
(PC) is limited, as they typically do not allow for theoretical motivation or 
interpretation, but reveal an impact on the estimated regression model (Brooks, 2008). 
Following the idea of PCA to derive a new set of variables called principal components 
that are orthogonal to each other i.e. straight, for those country-level variables that are 
most highly correlated. The first principal component consists of the three index 
variables – Disclosure, Liability Standard, and Public enforcement – that belong to the 
group, describing the legal enforcement (Appendix IV). As these indexes are perfectly 
                                                
44 Rule of thumb: Corr (xi, xj) ≥ 0.8 (near multicollinearity). 
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collinear to the rule of law and corruption indexes, the two build the second principal 
component representing the quality of legal framework (Appendix III). There is a great 
deal of common variation in the series of 87% and 100% that the PCA output reveals. 
The respective correlation matrix (Appendix V) for the PCAs still indicates a 
correlation greater than 0.8. The original country-levels are therefore replaced 
separately by the two principal components – QLF_pc and LE_pc – and the OLS 
regression of Equation 1 is re-run. The estimation output (Appendix VI) of the 
respective coefficients at the1% significance level, implies that the findings are 
unaffected by the presence of collinearity in the data and are consistent with those in 
Appendix II. The LE_pc is positive, whereas the QLF_pc is negative, which is 
consistent with the former model specifications and hence the essence of the overall 
findings remains intact (Appendix VII). 
 
The overall fit of the data to the regression model indicates how well the included 
explanatory variables actually explain variations in the dependent variable, 
underpricingij. The most common goodness of fit statistic is to look at the squares of the 
correlation coefficients defined by R squared (Brooks, 2008). The value of R squared45 
from the regression result (Appendix II) in this study is with approximately 0,2 not 
particularly high, but this is rather expected, as there are numerous more explanations 
determining IPO underpricing as outlined throughout the thesis.  
 
Even though the authors tried to solve for potential biases and generate significant 
results and the regression generally confirms the results of the initial model, it is 
unlikely that all potential omitted correlated variables are captured and definite answers 
at least at a high significance level (p < 0,01) are not possible to conclude for all the 
variables of interest. 
 
                                                
45 Values for R2 range from 0 to 1 indicating that the model explains almost all variability oft he 
dependent variable. 
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4 Empirical results 
This section provides the empirical results of the research conducted. It starts with a 
market activity and underpricing overview. The following paragraph introduces the 
descriptive statistics of the pooled sample as well as the respective country samples. 
Afterwards, the outcomes of the hypotheses testing are introduced and interpreted. 
Finally, this section concludes with a summary of results, which merges previous 
literature and findings from this study. 
 
4.1 IPO activity and underpricing 
The IPO activity in Europe has been increasing over the last decade, but was recently 
hit by the financial crisis. Figure 1 shows the IPO activity of Germany and UK and the 
levels of underpricing respectively. 
 
Figure 1: IPO Activity and level of underpricing 
 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ Database, adjusted by authors) 
 
Previous literature revealed the dependency of IPO activity on country-level laws and 
governance institutions. The British governance system is characterised by a well 
developed and active capital market of corporate control aligned with a substantial 
investor protection (Georgen and Renneboog, 2007). Hence, the activity is higher in 
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common law countries compared to countries belonging to the civil law origin. 
However, there further exists a relation between IPO activity and domestic market 
conditions. Consistently, firms are assumed to increase public trading activity when 
valuations are higher in the home market (Doidge, 2011). According to Lowry and 
Schwert (2002), both IPO volume and average initial returns are highly correlated and 
the initiatives of going public increase after periods of abnormal high initial returns 
(often referred to as ’hot-market-periods’ or simply ’hot issues’), which indicate 
underpriced IPOs. This is in line with Ritter and Welch (2002) who confirm the 
correlation between underpricing and issuing activity in the subsequent months. The 
findings are based on the argument that underwriters might encourage more firms to 
enter the stock market when valuations turn out to be higher than expected and in turn 
discourage firms from filing or proceeding when valuations are lower than expected 
(Ritter and Welch, 2002). However, the graphs above interestingly indicate a mixed 
support for the implemented theories. 
 
The trend observed in the German IPO market supports the findings by Ritter and 
Welch (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2002), that underpricing leads to an increase in 
IPO activity in the following periods. The low number of new issues in the beginning of 
the investigated period experiences a substantial subsequent upward trend. The same 
can be seen for the average first day return i.e. level of underpricing. The German IPO 
market shows a drop in activity and underpricing in 2012, which might be due to the 
ending of the First/Second Quotation Board at the Open Market segment of the DBAG 
in 2012. The segment with the lowest listing requirements was subject to manipulation 
and consequently shut down in April 2012. According to arguments about the link of 
underpricing to the strength of disclosure requirements (Shi et al., 2007), those IPOs 
were probably the issues underpriced the most, which might explain the low point. The 
IPO market report published by PwC (2013) saw an increase in proceeds despite a 
reduced number of IPOs, and the Deutsche Börse index DAX was the best performing 
index. This might also indicate the arguments established by La Porta et al. (1997), 
stating that civil law is better in times of crisis and hence a lower degree of underpricing 
is assumed in the subsequent period of the economic downturn. 
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The UK analysis shows contradictory movements to the above-mentioned empirical 
evidence. When underpricing decreases the activity seems to increase. The UK market 
shows a slight decline in 2012, followed by a sharp UPR growth in 2013, which is 
probably due to the amendment in EU Prospectus Directive and the implementation of 
the ‘High Growth Segment’ at the LSE. This also supports the finding that underpricing 
is extremely severe in high-tech/fast-growing companies due to their valuation 
difficulties, which was also derived by studies after the burst of the Dot-Com-Bubble 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003).  
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Variables are divided into country- and firm-specific items. The summary of descriptive 
statistics for the pooled sample is presented in tables 8 and 9. Particularly, P/E ratio, 
ln(proceeds), Age, IPO volume, and Market Cap are characterized by a high standard 
deviation and thus largely variable values, which is further indicated by the high spread 
of minimum and maximum amounts. These variables were subject to high variations in 
other research studies as well (Cahine et al., 2007; Engelen and Essen, 2010; Lin et al., 
2013). Nonetheless, the standard deviation for underpricing is significantly lower, 
compared to previous cross-country studies (Engelen and Essen, 2010; Shi et al., 2007; 
Boulton et al., 2010). It is notable that the amount of block and large shareholder is 
almost equal since most of the large owners (more than 100,000 shares) are block 
holders at the same time. The authors therefore introduced a dummy variable for large 
owners, to test for their influence on underpricing. Table 9 further shows that the 
country-specific index numbers in particular are well distributed since they mostly 
remain constant for both countries respectively. 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics firm-specific variables 
  UPR SB BLOCK LARGE Debt 
Level 
P/E Ratio ln(Proceeds) Age 
Mean 0,090 0,158 0,371 0,372 0,408 -17,796 3,004 17,876 
Median 0,067 0,031 0,334 0,341 0,328 0,000 2,838 7,000 
Maximum 0,603 1,000 1,000 1,000 3,439 196,447 7,139 178,000 
Minimum -0,269 -0,008 0,000 0,000 0,000 -2683,422 -1,475 0,000 
Std. Dev 0,137 0,391 0,292 0,292 0,409 206,223 1,916 22,769 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ database, La Portaet al., 2006, adjusted by authors) 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics country-level statistics 
  IPO 
Volume 
Market 
Cap 
DISC Index LIAB Index PUB Index COR Index ROL Index 
Mean 26,186 342,102 0,740 0,515 0,579 0,130 0,872 
Median 27,000 205,967 0,830 0,660 0,680 0,132 0,857 
Maximum 42,000 1672,613 0,830 0,660 0,680 0,135 0,923 
Minimum 2,000 55,650 0,420 0,000 0,220 0,125 0,857 
Std. Dev 11,947 336,749 0,170 0,274 0,191 0,003 0,274 
(Source: S&P Capital IQ database, La Portaet al., 2006, adjusted by authors) 
 
The primary focus of this research is the level of underpricing. Table 10 summarises 
this main variable for Germany and the UK respectively. Sample clustering exists in 
this study, as roughly 78% of the sample companies belong to the UK market. This is 
not surprising, since the UK represents the largest and most active IPO market within 
Europe (Georgen and Renneboog, 2007). 
 
Table 10: Underpricing in UK and Germany 
UPR N Mean Median Maximum Minimum StdDev 
Germany 39 0,032 0,001 0,866 -0,269 0,161 
UK 138 0,160 0,086 5,180 -0,989 0,488 
Total 177 0,090 0,067 0,603 -0,269 0,137 
(Source: created by authors) 
 
On average, UK IPOs have an initial return of 16% and a median initial return of 8.6% 
which is coherent with prior empirical findings that showed similar results (Engelen and 
Essen, 2010; Boulton et al., 2010; Hopp and Dreher, 2007). The large range (lower 
limit = -98,9%; upper limit = 518%) implies a high standard deviation of the sample of 
48.8%, which is coherent with the researchers predictions as consequence of the large 
proportion of highly speculative Penny Stocks in the sample. As a result it can be said 
that initial returns in the UK are highly uncertain. 
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German IPOs show a considerable low level of underpricing. That contradicts most of 
the previous literature that found IPOs in common law structures being less underpriced 
(Figure 2). Nonetheless, it supports La Porta et al. (1998) argument that civil law 
structures work better in times of crisis and thus create less ex ante uncertainty which in 
turn leads to a lower level of underpricing. 
 
Figure 2: UPR cross-country perspective 
 
(Source: created by authors) 
 
Figure 3 shows the discrepancy of results compared to previous empirical findings.  A 
complete overview of the shown studies, including sample size and investigated period, 
can be found in Table 1. This confirms the researchers expectations, as a consequence 
of the cutting financial crisis of 2008. Although, considering the relatively small 
German sample size, it is more evenly distributed with a low standard deviation. First 
day price jumps in Germany never exceeded the 100% mark (maximum 86,6%). 
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Figure 3: Overview of UPR levels in previous studies 
 
(Source: created by authors) 
 
4.3 Regression results 
The multi linear regression model explained in section 3.3, allows establishing a 
relationship between explanatory and response variables. The following sections 
provide an overview of the hypotheses testing outcomes. The chapter is divided into 
country and firm-specific outcomes. 
 
4.3.1 Country-specific analysis 
4.3.1.1 Legal origin 
To test the influence of the legal framework on the level of underpricing a common law 
dummy variable is established. Common law countries show a high level of protection, 
which would indicate a lower level of uncertainty (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). This 
leads to the general assumption that underpricing might be lower in common law 
countries (Engelen and Essen, 2010; Hopp and Dreher, 2007; Shit et al., 2007). 
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The regression analysis shows a positive relationship (βCOM46 = 0,2656) between the 
common law dummy variable and underpricing at a 1% significance level (Appendix 
II). Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected for this sample, meaning companies 
belonging to the common law origin are more likely to be underpriced. This is further 
supported by the descriptive results, showing a mean underpricing of 16% for the UK 
and 3% for Germany. This finding contradicts most of the previous literature, which 
found civil law firms to be more underpriced than common law firms (Engelen and 
Essen, 2010; Hopp and Dreher, 2007; Shi et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the present 
findings are supported by Lin et al. (2013) and other studies focusing on ownership 
structure and legal origin (Brennnan and Franks, 1997; Boulton et al., 2010; Smart and 
Zutter, 2003), who also found a positive relationship of common law and underpricing. 
 
As the authors expected, the legal origin effect might be reversed during and after a 
crisis period. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) already assumed that civil law structures 
create less uncertainty because generally, firms have lower debt levels compared to 
common law structures. However, this does not hold true for this study since debt levels 
in Germany are higher than in the UK (Table 11). The regression analysis does not offer 
a significant test result for the debt level variable. 
 
The authors assume that the lower level of underpricing is related to the considerable 
lower age of companies in the UK. Previous literature, focusing on information 
asymmetries, stated that younger companies are more underpriced, mainly because of 
lack of information und the perceived level of uncertainty involved (among others, 
Ljungqvist, 2007; Engelen and Essen, 2010). This sample also shows a notably higher 
market capitalization for German firms, which further indicated that more mature and 
established companies went public, whereas in the UK companies where almost 50% 
smaller on average (Table 11). 
 
                                                
46 β is the coefficient estimate of the regression results.  
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Table 11: Average country-specific firm characteristics 
  Age Debt Level Market Cap 
Germany 42,1 0,4468 597,7982 
UK 11,0 0,3968 269,8394 
Total 17,9 0,4078 342,1015 
(Source: created by authors) 
 
4.3.1.2 Legal framework 
Law enforcement 
Lin et al. (2013) and Engelen and Essen (2010) found evidence that legal enforcement 
is negatively related to the level of underpricing. Therefore, better and more stringent 
law enforcement leads to less IPO underpricing which seems logical as the level of ex 
ante uncertainty is reduced. 
 
This research found different results. The three established variables, representing law 
enforcement, are positively related to underpricing in this sample. Thus, the null 
hypothesis is highly rejected at a 1% significance level for disclosure and public 
enforcement index, whereas at a marginal 10% level for the liability index. This 
indicates that there is a significant different impact of common- or civil law on 
underpricing. The researcher expected that the negative relationship might be reversed, 
since the focus of this study lies on the after crisis period. As literature suggests the law 
enforcement is strongest in the UK with disclosure, liability standard, and public 
enforcement index numbers being over 0,60 (1 is highest and 0 is lowest value) (La 
Porta et al., 1998, 2006; Engelen and Essen, 2010; Lin et al., 2013). Germany on the 
other hand, is characterized by relatively low law enforcement with all index variables 
being less than 0,5 (La Porta et al., 2006). 
 
Shi et al. (2007) found evidence that IPO underpricing is negatively associated with the 
strength of disclosure requirements. This is a logical conclusion since more stringent 
disclosure requirements reduce information asymmetries, which consequently lead to 
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lower underpricing. Nonetheless, there is mixed empirical evidence. Hopp and Dreher 
(2007) found disclosure requirements being positively correlated with underpricing, 
which supports the present findings of this study. They relate this finding to the fact that 
disclosure improvements could lead to transient ownership and thus volatile stock 
prices. The researchers believe that the large number of Penny Stocks in the UK sample 
could influence the results. 
 
The liability index represents the burden of proof. The higher the index, the lower the 
burden of proof. It indicates the difficulty of recovering losses in a civil liability case 
(La Porta et al., 2006). Generally, the liability index has a positive influence on 
underpricing (Shi et al., 2007; Hopp and Dreher, 2007). This is approved by the present 
study. Even though a significantly positive relationship of the chosen liability standard 
and underpricing was found, the results are marginal and no strong inference can be 
made. However, these findings are consistent with the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis that 
considers underpricing as means to reduce potential legal liability at least playing a 
second order in IPO underpricing (Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Tinic, 1988; Lowry and 
Shu, 2002). 
 
The public enforcement index is significantly lower for German civil law structures 
than in UK common law (La Porta et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2007). It shows a highly 
significant (p <0,01) positive relationship with the dependent variable, which seems 
irrational. It could be that the index is obsolete, since the numbers are taken from 2006. 
Further, an inconsistency with the corruption index exists as well. The higher law 
enforcement index should indicate a lower level of corruption, which is not the case for 
the UK compared to Germany. It could also be argued that public enforcement itself 
does not significantly influence the behaviour and decisions of participants involved in 
the IPO process (investors, underwriters, firms). Jackson and Roe (2006) suggest 
splitting public enforcement and private enforcement and found that private 
enforcement has a more significant influence on capital markets than public 
enforcement. Nonetheless, until now there does not exist a clear distinction between 
both index numbers. 
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Quality of legal framework 
The quality of legal framework is represented by two index numbers, namely the 
corruption and rule of law index. Both variables show a significant negative influence 
on underpricing. This is supported by previous literature (Engelen and Essen, 2010; 
Hopp and Dreher, 2007; Lin et al., 2013). 
 
The corruption index generally, is higher in Germany, than in the UK sample. This 
indicates that in the UK corruption is higher (the higher the index, the lower 
corruption). The existence of corruption can create uncertainty that on the other hand 
leads to a higher level of underpricing. Therefore, it is a logical conclusion that UK 
common law countries are more underpriced. On the other hand the higher corruption 
index for the UK contradicts the high law enforcement variables. 
 
Rule of law, representing law and traditions in the respective countries has a significant 
negative relationship with underpricing. That was also found by previous empirical 
research on this topic (Engelen and Essen, 2010; Hopp and Dreher, 2007; Lin et al., 
2013). It seems to be a logical result that a higher ROL reduce the level of underpricing. 
The rule of law index can also be interpreted as investors’ confidence in a legal system 
(Kaufmann et al., 2005) and thus the perceived risk of investing is lower in Germany 
(ROL = 0,923) than in the UK (ROL = 0,857). As a logical consequence the level of 
underpricing is also considerably lower in Germany illustrated by the descriptive 
statistics of the two countries (Table 10). 
 
4.3.1.3 Ownership structure 
To test whether the ownership structure determines the level of underpricing, the 
variables shareholder breadth and shareholder inequality are established. There is 
various empirical evidence that larger shareholder breadth and equality is positively 
correlated to underpricing (Brennan and Franks, 1997; Booth and Chua, 1996; Pham et 
al., 2003; Boulton et al., 2010; Smart and Zutter, 2003). Therefore, large and 
blockholder owners as indicators for a considerable shareholder inequality, are assumed 
to have a negative influence on underpricing (Pham et al., 2003).  
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Contradictory to these previous studies, this study does not find significant evidence for 
a relationship of ownership structure and underpricing. Nonetheless, a conflicting trend 
was detected. According to the data collected, UK firms seem to have a larger 
proportion of institutional blockholders than German firms. The German sample on the 
other hand is characterised by a large proportion of CEO blockholders (Figure 4). 
Further, the shareholder breadth between both countries only shows minor deviations 
(Germany 14%, UK 16%; Figure 4). These findings indicate that after the crisis the 
ownership structure changed severely. It seems that the UK, although having a legal 
system that focuses on minority shareholders, turns to favour institutional and large 
shareholders. 
 
Figure 4: Ownership distribution by country 
 
(Source: created by authors) 
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Chambers and Dimson (2009) already stated that institutional holders became more 
powerful in recent years. This is surprising since the level of underpricing is 
significantly higher in the UK, which usually attracts small investors (Brennan and 
Franks, 1997; Pham et al., 2003). The researcher believes that this reversed 
phenomenon can also be explained by the loss of confidence in the capital markets after 
the crisis (Glavina, 2013; PwC, 2010). Institutions kept investing while small investors 
rather saved their money than investing it in speculative and uncertain shares. It is 
assumed that this risk avoiding behaviour of small investors could have caused these 
specific sample characteristics. When comparing the investigated sample with previous 
research by La Porta et al. (1998) it becomes clear that blockholders became very 
important investors during the last decade (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Proportion blockholder ownership 1998 versus 2014 
 
(Source: created by authors) 
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4.3.2 Summary of findings 
The outcomes of the regression analysis show controversial results. The authors found 
that underpricing is significantly positively related to common law and law 
enforcement, which can hardly be related to previous empirical findings. The quality of 
legal framework is as expected and confirmed by historical literature, negatively related 
to the level of underpricing. For the hypotheses related to the ownership structure, no 
significant results were found for neither of the two measures. However, a change in the 
generally assumed ownership structure was discovered that would make a logical 
implication to one of the countries arbitrary. A large proportion of institutional block 
shareholders characterise the UK sample, which contradicts to the assumed ownership 
patterns. An overview of the influence of all tested variables on underpricing is 
illustrated in table 12. 
 
Table 12: Summary of results 
    
 
  
Dependent Variable: UPR 
 
  
Period: 2009-2013   
 
  
Variable  Hypothesis  Coefficient 
c N/A 18,57195 ** 
COMMON_LAW 
DV + 0,265575 * 
ROL_INDEX - -0,875377 * 
COR_INDEX - -79,92635 *** 
LIAB_INDEX + 0,0387617 * 
BLOCK - -0,015   
LARGE_DV + 0,024015   
SB - -0,029397   
    
 
  
AGE - -2,57E-05   
IPO_VOLUME - 0,00707 ** 
VC_DV - 0,050311 *** 
INDUSTRY_DV - -0,006097   
DEBT_LEVEL + 0,007218   
LN_PROCEEDS - -0,012409 *** 
MARKET_CAP - -0,000268   
RECESSION_DV - -0,409127 ** 
PE + 5,70E-06   
*      p< 0,01 
 
R2 0,1979   
**    p< 0,05    
***  p< 0,10    
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5 Conclusion 
The following section comprises a discussion of results. The authors interpret empirical 
findings of this study in conjunction with previous research. Further, strategic 
implications for participants involved in the IPO process are outlined. Finally, 
suggestions for further research on this topic are proposed. 
 
5.1 Concluding discussion 
In order to address the main objective of this thesis, the authors compared IPOs from 
the UK and GER as appropriate representatives of the two legal systems of common 
and civil law during the most recent years. The purpose of the study is to add further 
knowledge with regards to IPO underpricing in a cross-country context by answering 
the question of what role a country´s institutional framework plays as a determinant of 
IPO underpricing with respect to different legal origins. In addition to that, the authors 
initially intend to connect and draw a conclusion on the findings to the countries 
ownership structure associated to their legal system.    
 
To give answers to the proposed questions and achieve the purpose of the study, a 
regression analysis of underpricing on the most frequently used firm-specific and 
country-specific variables are conducted. An important consideration when concluding 
the findings is the authors’ anticipations towards possible reverse effects of the 
coefficient estimates and implications caused by the recent financial crisis. The 
following Table 13 illustrates the proposed hypotheses next to their respective empirical 
results. 
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Table 13: Hypotheses and empirical results 
  
 
      
Variables  Hypothesis 
Empirical 
Results sign.    
Country-level  
 
      
Common law DV +/- + ** ✓ 
  
 
      
Quality of legal framework - - * ✓ 
Legal enforcement - + * ✕ 
  
 
      
Firm-level 
 
      
Shareholder Breadth: 
 
      
SB - +   ⊗ 
Shareholder Inequality: 
 
      
BLOCK - -   ⊗ 
  
 
      
*      p< 0,01 
**    p< 0,05 
***  p< 0,10 
 
 
When summarising the previous sections, it is evidential that the financial crisis caused 
a major disruption of the capital markets in the UK and Germany. IPO activity has been 
highly volatile in both countries since 2009 (Figure 1). Also, the observation of 
underpricing being positively related to the common law origin stays in conflict to 
previous theories. Generally, common law is associated with lower levels of 
underpricing due to better minority shareholder protection and thus decreased 
uncertainty. The authors assume that the contradictory result could be related to the 
considerable lower age and thus higher uncertainty of companies in the UK. Further, 
German firms show a significantly higher market capitalization, which indicates 
thatmore mature and established companies went public. 
 
The law enforcement and quality of legal framework variables showed some 
controversial results. The level of law enforcement is higher in the UK than in 
Germany. Therefore, one would suggest that more stringent law enforcement creates 
less uncertainty and therefore reduces underpricing. But all three variables showed a 
positive impact on underpricing. This is a logical conclusion for the liability standard 
and is consistent with the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. A positive relationship for 
disclosure requirements and public enforcement on the other hand seems rather 
irrational. The authors believe that the results could be biased by the large amount of 
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Penny Stocks in the UK sample and thus highly volatile stock prices. Further, it is 
possible that the index numbers used are obsolete. The public enforcement variable 
further stays in conflict with the corruption index. The corruption index appears to be 
lower for the UK sample, meaning there is a higher level of corruption. But law 
enforcement on the other hand is stronger in the UK than in Germany. The finding that 
the quality of legal framework is significantly negatively related to underpricing is 
confirmed by various previous studies. The higher level of corruption and lower rule of 
law index for the UK emphasize the considerable higher level of underpricing. 
 
When applying theories of ownership and control to the present sample it seems that in 
the aftermath of the crisis ownership structures have changed significantly. Thus, 
established theories could not be confirmed. Although no significant relationship of 
underpricing and ownership variables was found, it was discovered that UK firms are 
characterised by a large proportion of institutional blockholders, which is rather unusual 
but might be due to the loss of confidence, especially of small investors in the financial 
markets. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the financial crisis did impact underpricing clusters of 
the stock markets of UK and GER through the quality of legal framework and legal 
enforcement had a significant influence and had reverse effects. At the same time the 
different findings make it such an interesting avenue of research, since it opposes the 
existing literature and findings related to the countries legal origin and institutional 
framework.  
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5.2 Strategic implications 
The conclusions found in this research offer the possibility to propose strategic advice 
for the different participants involved in an IPO process and the government. Therefore, 
the authors suggest underwriters, firms, and investors strategies to consider during this 
process, when there is an economic upturn or downturn. There are different implications 
for the UK and Germany as representatives for common and civil law respectively.  
 
The results of this thesis suggest that civil law is advantageous in times of crisis or 
economic downturns. Even though the authors are aware of the fact that the regression 
results do not support any significant ownership implications, the revealed ownership 
structures in Figure 4 indicate a desirable allocation and pricing of shares in an IPO. 
One striking feature concerning the ownership structure of the civil law country is the 
high retention of CEO ownership in GER. Hence, assuming the underwriter has full 
discretion over allocation of shares in an IPO with respect to the previous results the 
authors suggest that they should favour firms with CEOs as shareholder. The reason for 
the outperformance indicates and supports the theory proposed by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) that CEO ownership reduces the bargaining power of issuing firm decision-
makers for a higher offer price and hence a more accurate pricing or less underpricing. 
The increased incentive to avoid underpricing from a CEO point of view is argued by 
these researchers, as the market value of the CEO’s holdings equal opportunity cost in 
the same amount that is money-left-on-the-table. Moreover, this backs the monitoring 
and reduced agency cost argument. A CEO representing a large shareholder, has more 
power to monitor managerial decisions and appear to limit total issuing costs with 
regards to the smaller number of shareholders after listing (Pham et al., 2003). It might 
further indicate that CEO as an insider knows best about the strengths, weaknesses and 
the opportunities of his firms and do not give his approval to the transaction if he has 
any doubts about the success. This single-handedly approval by the CEO is only usual 
in civil, but never in common law countries (Djankov, 2007).  
 
The authors suggest firms and their underwriters in a civil law country and economic 
upturn to attract more smaller or outside investors that creates a broader base of 
potential traders, resulting in even more active trading, and hence, possibly improve 
aftermarket liquidity (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001).  
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From an investors’ perspective the status, if the participant is either informed or 
uninformed is crucial. For investors considered as informed it is regardless in which 
legal system they are active or the market or the timing, since the authors define them as 
rational traders that are aware of the risk of their investment. On the other hand, 
uninformed investors are typically not aware of the riskiness of the investment. For this 
group of investors the market timing is highly important as a risk indicator of the 
investment.  In an economic downturn this group should adjust their activity and behave 
risk averse. For instance to invest only in stocks traded on the main markets, rather 
those on the AIM or Regulated unofficial market (Appendix XVII) respectively. Young 
and high-tech firms that incur a higher degree of uncertainty (Benveniste et al., 2003, 
Lin et al., 2013) and more speculative stocks characterise these parallel markets. In 
economic upturns this group of investors could invest more aggressive or risky rather in 
common law countries as they are assumed to be better protected.  
 
From a governments perspective the accurate or true valuation of firms that intend to go 
public could be a rudiment to interfere in order to decrease deteriorations on the 
domestic stock exchanges. It might be worth to consider employing an independent 
party that performs valuations and is integrated in the IPO process next to the usual 
participants. To avoid valuation manipulations, investors could consult not only the 
information (valuations) provided by their underwriters or firm’s annual reports, but 
additionally from an independent party. This could possibly increase the transparency 
levels prior to an IPO.  
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5.3 Future research opportunities 
Considering the findings and delimitations of this study together with previous research 
outcomes, the cross-country perspective on IPO underpricing should be further 
emphasized. The present sample showed a relatively high variable volatility why 
investigating the long-term implications of the financial crisis it is of interest. Thereby 
increasing the sample size and find additional indicators as well as increasing the 
explanatory power. Moreover, a more thorough investigation on the institutional 
frameworks is recommended such as the subsequent impact of special or severe 
regulatory changes on the underpricing behaviour i.e. stricter disclosure regulations in 
the prospectus. An analysis of different sample countries is suggested that strengthen 
the limited previous findings. Notably, in the context of institutional framework it is 
recommended to identify or establish more recent indices as quality measures of the 
studied countries. The indices of legal- framework and –enforcement were established 
before the considered periods in this study and other existing literature. An increase or 
decrease in the respective indices might give additional and more accurate information 
about the impact of different institutional frameworks on the IPO underpricing patterns.  
 
Particularly, the discovered change of ownership structure for the typical legal systems 
reveal a further avenue of research. It will be interesting to examine how the degree of 
underpricing evolves according to those variations. Future research on a global level by 
connecting the stock market behaviour and thereby IPO underpricing to a 
macroeconomic environment/dynamics is another promising opportunity. For instance, 
the impact of the current striking Ukraine and Russian turbulences on the IPO market 
and investors sentiment is worth investigating.  
 
  
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
78 
6 References 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970): The market for ‘lemons’: quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No.3, pp. 488-500. 
Alavi, A., Pham, P.K., Pham, T.M. (2008): Pre-IPO ownership structure and its impact 
on the IPO process, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 32, No.11, pp. 2361-2375. 
Allen, F., Faulhaber, G.R. (1989): Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market. 
Journal of financial Economics, Vol. 23, No.2, pp. 303-323. 
Amihud, Y., Shmuel H., Amir K. (2001): Allocations, adverse selection and cascades 
in IPOs: Evidence from Israel, Working paper, No. FIN-01-017, New York University. 
Asquith, D., Jones, J.D., Kieschnick, R. (1998): Evidence on price stabilization and 
underpricing in early IPO returns, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No.5, pp. 1759-
1773. 
Baker, M., Gompers, P.A., (2003): The Determinants of Board Structure and the Initial 
Public Offering, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 46, No. 2 ,pp. 569-598.  
Baron, D.P. (1982): A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and 
Distribution Services for New Issues, Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, pp. 955-976. 
Baron, D.P., Holmström, B. (1980): The investment banking contract for new issues 
under asymmetric information: Delegation and the incentive problem, The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 35, No.5, pp. 1115-1138. 
Barry, C., Muscarella C., Peavy, J., Vetsuypens, M., (1990): The Role of Venture 
Capitalists in the Creation of a Public Company, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
27, No. 2, pp. 447–71. 
Barry, C.B., Muscarella, C.J., Vetsuypens, M.R. (1991): Underwriter warrants, 
underwriter compensation, and the costs of going public, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 29, No.1, pp. 113-135. 
Beatty, R.P., Ritter, J.R. (1986): Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing 
of initial public offerings, Journal of financial economics, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 213-232. 
Benveniste, L.M., Busaba, W.Y. (1997): Bookbuilding vs. fixed price: An analysis of 
competing strategies for marketing IPOs, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 32, No.4, pp. 383-403. 
Benveniste, L.M., Busaba, W.Y., Wilhelm Jr, W.J. (1996): Price stabilization as a 
bonding mechanism in new equity issues, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 42, 
No.2, pp. 223-255. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
79 
Benveniste, L.M., Ljungqvist, A.P, Wilhelm, Jr, W.J., Yu, X.  (2003): Evidence of 
Information Spillovers in the Production of Investment Banking Services, The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 2. Pp. 577-608. 
Benveniste, L.M., Spindt, P.A. (1989): How investment bankers determine the offer 
price and allocation of new issues, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 24, No.2, pp.  
343-361. 
Benveniste, L.M., Wilhelm, W.J. (1990): A comparative analysis of IPO proceeds under 
alternative regulatory environments, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 28, No.1, pp. 
173-207. 
Bessler, W., Drobetz, W., Seim, M. (2014): Share repurchases of initial public 
offerings: motives, valuation effects, and the impact of market regulation, European 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 232–263. 
Bessler, W., Kurth, A. (2007): Agency Problem and the Performance of Venture-backed 
IPOs in Germany: Exit Strategies, Lock-up Periods, and Bank Ownership, The 
European Journal of Finance, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 29-63. 
Biais, B., Faugeron-Crouzet, A.M. (2002): IPO auctions: English, Dutch,… French, and 
Internet. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 11, No.1, pp. 9-36. 
Booth, J.R. Chua, L. (1996): Ownership dispersion, costly information, and IPO 
underpricing, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 291–310. 
Boulton, T. J., Smart, S. B., and Zutter, C. J. (2009): Earnings Quality and International 
IPO Underpricing. The Accounting Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 483-505. 
Boulton, T.J., Smart, S.B., Zutter, C.J. (2010): IPO underpricing and international 
corporate governance, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 41, No.2, pp. 
206-222. 
Brennan, M.J., Franks, J. (1997): Underpricing, ownership and control in initial public 
offerings of equity securities in the UK, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 45, pp. 
391–413. 
Brooks, C., (2008): Introductory Econometrics for Finance, 2nd ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cahine, S., (2008): Underpricing versus gross spread: New evidence on the effect of 
sold shares at the time of IPOs, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 
18, pp. 180–196. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
80 
Cahine, S., Filatotchev, I., Wright, M. (2007): Venture Capitalists, Business Angels, 
and Performance of Entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France, Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, Vol. 34, No. ¾, pp. 505-528. 
Chambers, D., Dimson, E. (2009): IPO Underpricing over the Very Long Run, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 1407–1443. 
Chemmanur, T.J., Liu, H. (2006): How should a firm go public? A dynamic model of 
the choice between fixed-price offerings and auctions in IPOs and privatizations, 
Working Paper, Boston College and University of Kentucky. 
Chen, G., Firth, M., Kim, J.B. (2004): IPO underpricing in China´s new stock markets, 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 183-302. 
Cheung, Y.L., Qi, Y., Raghavendra-Rau, P., Stouraitis, A. (2009): Buy high, sell low: 
How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions, Journal of Banking 
& Finance, Vol. 33, No.5, pp. 914-924. 
Chowdhry, B., Nanda, V. (1996): Stabilization, syndication, and pricing of IPOs, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No.1, pp. 25-42. 
Chowdhry, B., Sherman, A. (1996): The winner´s curse and international methods of 
allocating initial public offerings, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 4, pp.15-30. 
Cornelli, F., Goldreich, D. (2001): Bookbuilding and strategic allocation, The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 6, pp. 2337-2369. 
Cornelli, F., Goldreich, D. (2003): Bookbuilding: How Informative Is the Order Book?, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 1415-1443. 
DBAG (2014): Why Consider to be Listed on Deutsche Börse – The World’s only IPO 
One-Stop Shop, [PDF], Deustche Börse Group. Available from: http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/kir/gdb_navigation_other_languages/ru/lc/20_listing_at_d
eutsche_boerse?horizontal=russia_listing_6_Audio_Listing_Guide, [Accessed 
20/04/14]. 
Derrien, F., Womack, K.L. (2003): Auctions vs. bookbuilding and the control of 
underpricing in hot IPO markets, Review of Financial studies, Vol. 16, No.1, pp. 31-61. 
Doidge, C. (2011): The U.S. Left Behind: The Rise of IPO Activity Around the World, 
Working Paper, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Drake, P.D., Vetsuypens, M.R. (1993): IPO underpricing and insurance against legal 
liability, Financial Management, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 64-73. 
Eckbo, B.E. (Ed.) (2007): Handbook of Corporate Finance. Empirical Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier Inc 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
81 
Ellingsen, T., Rydqvist, K., The Stock Market as a Screening Device and the Decision 
to Go Public, Working Paper, Economics and Finance, No. 174. 
Engelen, P.J. (2003): Underpricing of IPOs – Belgian Evidence, European Review of 
Economics and Finance, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 53-69. 
Engelen, P.J., van Essen, M. (2010): Underpricing of IPOs: Firm-, issue-and country-
specific characteristics, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 34, No.8, pp. 1958-1969. 
Gajewski J.F., Gresse, C. (2006): A Survey of the European IPO Market, Working 
Paper, No. 2, European Capital Markets Institute.  
Glavina, S. (2013): European IPO Market, Global And Regional Stock Exchanges, 
Economics and Management, Vol. 18, No.4, pp. 632-642. 
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L. (2007): Does ownership matter? A study of German and 
UK IPOs, Managerial Finance, Vol. 33, No.6, pp. 368-387. 
Greener, S. (2008): Business Research Methods, [ebook], Ventus Publishing ApS, 
Available from: http://www.ftvs.cuni.cz/hendl/metodologie/introduction-to-research-
methods.pdf, [Accessed 16/04/14]. 
Gregoriou, G.N. (2006): Initial Public Offerings_An International Perspective of IPOs, 
Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann 
Grinblatt, M., Hwang, C.Y. (1989): Signalling and the pricing of new issues. The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, No.2, pp. 393-420. 
Günther, S, Rummer, M. (2006): The hot-issue period in Germany: what factors drove 
IPO underpricing?, In: Gregoriou, G.N. Initial Public Offerings_An International 
Perspective of IPOs, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 215-245. 
Habib, M.A., Ljungqvist, A.P. (2001): Underpricing and entrepreneurial wealth losses 
in IPOs: Theory and evidence, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14, No.2, pp. 433-458. 
Hanley, K. W. (1993): The underpricing of initial public offerings and the partial 
adjustment phenomenon, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 231–250. 
Hanley, K., Wilhelm, W.J., (1995): Evidence on the strategic allocation of initial public 
offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 239–257. 
Hopp, C., Dreher, A. (2007): Do Differences in Institutional and Legal Environments 
Explain Cross-Country Variations on IPO Underpricing?, Working Paper, No. 172, 
Zurich: KOF Swiss Economic Institute. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
82 
Hoque, H. (2014): Role of asymmetric information and moral hazard on IPO 
underpricing and lockup, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money, Vol. 30, pp. 81-105. 
Hughes, P.J., Thakor, A.V. (1992): Litigation risk, intermediation, and the underpricing 
of initial public offerings, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 5, No.4, pp. 709-742. 
Ibbotson, R.G. (1975), Price performance of common stock new issues, Journal of 
Financial  Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 235-272. 
Ibbotson, R.G., Jaffe, F.J. (1975): "Hot Issue" Markets, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
30, No. 4, pp. 1027–1042. 
Ibbotson, R.G., Sindelar, J.L., Ritter, J.R. (1994): The market's problems with the 
pricing of initial public offerings, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 7, No.1, 
pp. 66-74. 
Jagannathan, R., Sherman, A.E. (2006): Why do IPO auctions fail?, Working Paper, 
No. 12151, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Jegadeesh, N., Weinstein, M., Welch, I. (1993): An empirical investigation of IPO 
returns and subsequent equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, 
No.2, pp. 153-175. 
Jenkinson, T., Jones, H. (2004): Bids and allocations in European IPO bookbuilding, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, No.5, pp. 2309-2338. 
Jenkinson, T., Ljungqvist, A. (1996): Going Public: The Theory and Evidence on how 
Companies Raise Equity Finance, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Jenkinson, T.J. (1990): Initial public offerings in the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Japan, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 4, No.4, 
pp. 428-449. 
Jenkinson, T.J., Ljungqvist A.P. (2001): Going public: The Theory and Evidence on 
How Companies Raise Equity Finance, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. (2005): Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2004, Working Paper, No. 3630, Washington: World Bank Policy 
Research. 
Keloharju, M. (1993): The winner's curse, legal liability, and the long-run price 
performance of initial public offerings in Finland, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
34, No.2, pp. 251-277. 
Koh, F., Walter, T. (1989): A direct test of Rock’s model of the pricing of unseasoned 
issues, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2,  pp. 251–272. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
83 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. (2006): What works in securities laws?, 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, No.1, pp. 1-32. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (2002): Investor protection 
and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance, pp. 1147-1170. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (1997): Legal determinants 
of external finance, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 1131–1150. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (1998): Law and finance, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, pp. 1113–1155. 
Levis, M. (1990): The winner's curse problem, interest costs and the underpricing of 
initial public offerings. Economic Journal, Vol. 100, No.399, pp. 76-89. 
Lin, H.L., Pukthuanthong, K., Walker, T.J. (2013): An international look at the lawsuit 
avoidance hypothesis of IPO underpricing, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 19, pp. 
56-77. 
Ljungqvist, A. (1995): The timing, pricing, and long-term performance of initial public 
offerings, Unpublished dissertation, Nuffield College, Oxford University. 
Ljungqvist, A. (2003): Conflicts of interest and efficient contracting in IPOs, Working 
Paper, New York University. 
Ljungqvist, A. (2007): IPO Underpricing, In: Eckbo, B.E. (Ed.): Handbook of 
Corporate Finance, Empirical Corporate Finance, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier Inc, p. 
375-422. 
Ljungqvist, A., Nanda, V., Singh, R. (2006): Hot markets, investor sentiment, and IPO 
pricing, The Journal of Business, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 1667–1702. 
Ljungqvist, A.P., Wilhelm Jr, W.J. (2002): IPO allocations: discriminatory or 
discretionary?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 167-201. 
Ljungqvist, A.P., Wilhelm Jr, W.J., Jenkinson, T. (2003): Global integration in primary 
equity markets: The role of US banks and US investors, Review of Financial studies, 
Vol. 16, No.1, pp. 63-99. 
Ljungqvist, A.P., Wilhelm, Jr, W.J (2003): IPO pricing in the dot-com bubble, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No.2, pp.723-752. 
Ljungqvist, A.P., Wilhelm, Jr., W.J., Jenkinson, T. (2000): Has the introduction of 
bookbuilding increased the efficiency of international IPOs?, Working Paper, Oxford: 
Said Business School. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
84 
Logue, D.E. (1973): On the Pricing of Unseasoned Equity Issues: 1965-1969, Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 91-103. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J.R. (2002): Why Don´t Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money 
on the Table in IPOs?, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 413–443. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J.R. (2004): Why has IPO underpricing changed over time?, 
Financial management, pp. 5-37. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J.R., Rydqvist, K. (1994): Initial public offerings: International 
insights, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 2, No.2, pp. 165-199. 
Lowry, M., Schwert, G.W. (2002): IPO Market Cycles: Bubbles or Sequential 
Learning?, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 1171-1198. 
Lowry, M., Shu, S. (2002): Litigation risk and IPO underpricing, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 65, No.3, pp. 309-335. 
Megginson, W., Weiss, K.A., (1991): Venture capitalist certification in initial public 
offerings, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, pp. 879–903. 
Michaely, R., Shaw, W.H. (1994): The pricing of initial public offerings: Tests of 
adverse-selection and signalling theories, Review of Financial studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 
279-319. 
Muscarella, C.J., Vetsuypens, M.R. (1989): A simple test of Baron’s model of IPO 
underpricing. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 125–135. 
Nagata, K. (2013): Does earnings management lead to favourable IPO price formation 
or further underpricing? Evidence from Japan, Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, Vol. 23, pp. 301–313. 
Pham, P.K., Kalev, P.S., Steen, A.B. (2003): Underpricing, stock allocation, ownership 
structure and post-listing liquidity of newly listed firms, Journal of Banking & Finance, 
Vol. 27, pp. 919–947. 
Pukthuanthong, K., Roll, R., Walker, T. (2007): How employee stock options and 
executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 695-720. 
PwC (2010): IPO Watch Europe: Review of the year 2009, [PDF], Available from: 
https://www.pwc.pl/pl/ipo-watch-europe/2009_summary.pdf, [Accessed 09/04/14]. 
PwC (2012): IPO Watch Europe 2012, [Online], Available from: 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/audit-assurance/publications/ipo-watch-europe-2012.jhtml, 
[Accessed 09/04/14]. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
85 
PwC (2013): IPO Watch Europe Survey 2013, [PDF]. Available from: 
https://www.pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/ipo-watch-europe-q4-2013.pdf, [Accessed 
21/04/14]. 
Ritter, J.R. (1984): The hot issue market of 1980, Journal of Business, Vol. 57, No. 2, 
pp. 215–240. 
Ritter, J.R. (1987): The costs of going public, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 19, 
No.2, pp. 269-281. 
Ritter, J.R. (1988): The buying and selling behaviour of individual investors at the turn 
of the year, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, No.3, pp. 701-717. 
Ritter, J.R. (2003): Differences between European and American IPO Markets, 
European Financial Management, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 421-434. 
Ritter, J.R. (2013): Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics, [Online], Available 
from: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/, [Accessed 18/04/14]. 
Ritter, J.R., Welch, I. (2002): A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 1795-1828. 
Rock, K. (1986): Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of financial economics, Vol. 
15, No.1, pp. 187-212. 
Röell, A. (1996): The decision to go public: An overview, European Economic Review, 
Vol. 40, No.3, pp. 1071-1081. 
Ruud, J.S. (1993): Underwriter price support and the IPO underpricing puzzle, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 34, No.2, pp. 135-151. 
Rydqvist, K. (1997): IPO underpricing as tax-efficient compensation, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, Vol. 21, No.3, pp. 295-313. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., Thornhill, A. (2009): Research methods for business students. 
5th ed.. Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 
Sherman, A. (2000): IPOs and long-term relationships: An advantage of bookbuilding, 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 13, pp. 697-714. 
Sherman, A., Titman, S. (2002): Building the IPO orderbook: Underpricing and 
particpation limits with costly information, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 65, 
pp. 3-29. 
Sherman, A.E. (2005): Global trends in IPO methods: Book building vs. auctions with 
endogenous entry. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 615-649. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
86 
Shi, C., Pukthuanthong, K., Walker, T. (2007): Does disclosure regulation work? 
Evidence from international IPO markets, Working Paper, University of California at 
Irvine, San Diego State University and Concordia University. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1997): A survey of corporate governance, The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 52, No.2, pp. 737-783. 
Smart, S.B., Zutter, C.J. (2003): Control as a motivation for underpricing: a comparison 
of dual and single-class IPOs, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, pp. 85-110. 
Smith Jr, C.W. (1986): Investment banking and the capital acquisition process, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 15, No.1, pp. 3-29. 
Spatt, C., Srivastava, S. (1991): Preplay communication, participation restrictions, and 
efficiency in initial public offerings, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 4, No.4, pp. 709-
726. 
Stroughton, N.M., Zechner, J. (1998): IPO-mechanisms, monitoring and ownership 
structure, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 45–77. 
Suchard, J., (2009): The impact of venture capital backing on the corporate governance 
of Australian initial public offerings, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 33, pp. 
765–774. 
Taranto, M. (2003): Employee stock options and the underpricing of initial public 
offerings, Working Paper, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 
Tinic, S.M. (1988): Anatomy of initial public offerings of common stock, The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 43, No.4, pp. 789-822. 
Transparency International (2014): Corruption Perceptions Index, [Online], Available 
from: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview, {Accessed 20/04/14]. 
Wasserfallen, W., Wittleder, C. (1994): Pricing initial public offerings – Evidence from 
Germany, European Economic Review, Vol. 38, pp. 1505-1517. 
Welch, I. (1989): Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of initial 
public offerings, Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, pp. 421-449 
Welch, I. (1992): Sequential sales, learning and cascades, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
47, No. 2, pp. 695–732. 
Wiktionary.org, (2014) Intsitutional_framework, [Online], Available from: 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/institutional_framework, [Accessed 20/04/14]. 
Wruck, K. (1989): Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence From 
Private Equity Financings, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 3-28. 
Determinants of IPO underpricing – A comparison between UK and Germany  !
 
 
87 
Zheng, S.X., Li, M. (2008): Underpricing, ownership dispersion, and aftermarket 
liquidity of IPO stocks, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 15, pp. 436–45. 
 
!
 
 
88 
7 Appendix 
Appendix I: Correlation Matrices: Firm- and Country-Level 
                
  SB BLOCK LARGE Debt Level P/E Ratio ln(proceeds) Age 
SB 1,000 -0,296 -0,293 0,075 0,029 -0,578 0,011 
Block   1,000 0,980 0,060 -0,036 0,151 -0,063 
Large     1,000 0,065 -0,052 0,152 -0,114 
Debt Level       1,000 0,021 -0,007 -0,020 
P/E Ratio         1,000 -0,007 0,028 
ln(proceeds)           1,000 0,077 
Age             1,000 
No correlation greater than 0,5784.           
The authors only included a Large_DV as they are often representing blockholders simultaneously.   
  
               
  IPO Volume Market Cap DISC Index LIAB Index PUB Index COR Index ROL Index 
IPO Volume 1,000 -0,396 0,742 0,742 0,742 0,498 -0,742 
Market Cap   1,000 -0,405 -0,405 -0,405 -0,221 0,405 
DISC Index     1,000 1,000 1,000 0,709 -1,000 
LIAB Index       1,000 1,000 0,709 1,000 
PUB Index         1,000 0,709 -1,000 
COR Index           1,000 -0,709 
ROL Index             1,000 
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Appendix II: OLS Regression results of IPO Underpricing 
Dependent variable: UPR - Level of underpricing of IPOs from the UK and GER in period 2009-2013       
 Method: Least Square     Obs: 177 
 
      Robustness tests:       
              
Additional Control 
Variable   
Principal Component 
Analysis 
Independent variable 
 
  Coefficient    SE   Coef. SE   Coef. SE 
Intercept **   18,57195   8,560098             
Country-level                       
Common_law_DV *   0,2656   0,0689             
Quality of legal framework:                     
Rule of law  *   -0,8787   0,3277             
Corruption ***   -80,3578   44,6403             
Legal enforcement:                       
Liability Standard ***     0,3876 0,1075             
Disclosure  *     0,624115 0,174692             
Public enforcement  *     0,556276 0,155704             
                        
Firm-level                       
Shareholder Breadth     -0,02939   0,03027             
Shareholder inequality                       
Blockholder     -0,01500   0,04683             
Large_DV     0,024015   0,037459             
P/E ratio             5,70E-06 2,85E-05       
QLF_PC *                 -0,08678 0,026339 
LE_PC *                 0,06123 0,017139 
Control Variables                       
Year dummies   Included                 
Recession_DV **   0,0203   0,0517             
Age     -2,61E-05   8,18E-05             
Debt level     0,00879   0,025537             
LN_Proceeds *   -0,01241   0,007356             
Market Cap  **   -0,000268   0,000134             
VC_DV ***   -0,50311   0,028539             
IPO Volume **   -0,00707   0,002943             
Industry_DV                       
R2   0,197943    Sum squared resid 2,678179     Mean dependent var 0,090177  
Adjusted R2   0,117658    Log likelihood 119,7252     S.D. dependent var 0,136838  
S.E. of regression   0,128975    Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0,000002     Schwarz criterion -0,869040  
F-Stat * 2,30825    Wald F-statistic 3,985129     Durbin-Watson stat 1,854048  
*      p< 0,01                      Standard errors are adjusted for heterosketasticity using Whites (1980) robust standard errors. 
**    p< 0,05 
***  p< 0,10 
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Appendix III: Principal Component Analysis – QLF 
Principal Component Analysis - Quality of Legal Framework     
Observations: 177           
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 2, Average = 1)         
              
Number   Value  Difference  Proportion 
Cumulative 
Value 
Cumulative  
Proportion 
1   1,7903 1,1419 0,8547 1,7093 0,8647 
2   2,91E-01 --- 0,1453 2,0000 1,0000 
              
Eigenvectors (loadings):           
              
Variable   PC 1 PC2       
COR_INDEX   -0,707107 0,707107       
ROL_INDEX   0,707107 0,707107       
              
Ordinary Correlations:           
              
    COR_INDEX ROL_INDEX       
COR_INDEX   1         
ROL_INDEX   -0,709309 1       
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Appendix IV: Principal Component Analysis – LE 
PrincipalComponent Analysis - Legal Enforcement     
Observations: 177           
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 3, Average = 1)         
              
Number   Value  Difference Proportion 
Cumulative 
Value 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
1   3,0000 3,0000 1,0000 3,0000 1,0000 
2   5,86E-17 3,39E-16 0,0000 3,0000 1,0000 
3   -2,81E-16 --- 0,0000 3,0000 1,0000 
              
Egenvectors (loadings):         
              
Variable   PC 1 PC2 PC3     
DISC_INDEX 0,57735 0,742665 0,339287     
LIAB_INDEX 0,57735 -0,077502 -0,81281     
PUB_INDEX 0,57735 -0,665163 0,473523     
              
OrdinaryCorrelations:           
              
    DISC_INDEX LIAB_INDEX PUB_INDEX   
DISC_INDEX 1         
LIAB_INDEX 1 1       
PUB_INDEX 1 1 1     
              
 
 
Appendix V: Correlation Matrix - PCs 
Correlation Matrix - Principal Components 
        
  LE_PC QLF_PC 
 LE_PC 1 -0,924475 
 QLF_PC -0,924475 1 
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Appendix VI: OLS regression of IPO underpricing on PCs 
Method: Least Square            
Observations: 177             
                
Dependent varibale: UPR - Level of underpricing of IPOs from the UK and GER in period 2009-2013   
                
Independent variable .   Coefficient    SE     
Intercept **   18,57195   8,560098     
                
QLF_PC *   -0,086782   0,026339     
LE_PC *   0,061233   0,017139     
                
Control Variables             
Year dummies Included           
Recession_DV **   0,0203   0,0517     
                
Age     -1,20E-04   7,07E-05     
Debt level     0,00879   0,025537     
LN_Proceeds     -0,01241   0,007356     
Market Cap      -0,000268   0,000134     
VC_DV     -0,50311   0,028539     
P/E ratio     5,70E-06   2,85E-05     
                
IPO Volume **   -0,00707   0,002943     
Industry_DV               
                
R2   0,180851           
Adjusted R2   0,098936           
F-Stat * 2,207789           
Standard errors are adjusted for heterosketasticity using Whites (1980) robust standard errors.   
*      p< 0,01               
**    p< 0,05               
***  p< 0,10               
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Linear regression model assumptions and diagnostic tests  
Appendix VIII: Diagnostic tests–Heteroskedasticity 
 
Heteroskedasticity test: White           
Dependent Variable: Residual2           
F - statistic      0,637844   Prob F-stat   0,7635 
Obs * R2     5,882151   Prob Chi² (9) 0,7517 
Scaled explained SS   65,21509   Prob Chi² (9) 0,0000 
The number of explanatory variables in parentheses.       
 
 
Appendix IX: Diagnostic Tests – Endogeneity 
Endogeneity - Hausman Test       
Dependent Variable:UPR   Prob.   
Residuals       0,0000   
Fitted values       0,0000   
            
R2       1,0   
Observations       177   
 
 
Appendix X: Histogram – BJ Normality Test 
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Appendix XI: Newey-West robust SE 
Dependent Varianle: UPR 
Method: Least Squares 
 HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-
Westfixed bandwidth = 5.0000) 
Period: 2009-2013 
Varibale Coefficient 
c 18,57195 ** 
COMMON_LAW DV 0,265575 * 
ROL_INDEX -0,875377 * 
COR_INDEX -79,92635 ** 
LIAB_INDEX 0,0387617 * 
BLOCK -0,015   
LARGE_DV 0,024015   
SB -0,029397   
      
AGE -2,57E-05   
IPO_VOLUME 0,00707 ** 
VC_DV 0,050311 *** 
INDUSTRY_DV -0,006097   
DEBT_LEVEL 0,007218   
LN_PROCEEDS -0,012409 *** 
MARKET_CAP -0,000268 ** 
RECESSION_DV -0,409127 ** 
PE 5,70E-06   
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Appendix XII: Parameter Stability Tests – Recursive Residuals 
Appendix XIII: Parameter Stability Tests – CUSUM Test 
!
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Appendix XVIII: Transparency Level Deutsche Börse AG 
Regulated Market       
          
Prime Standard Quarterly financial statements   
    English language   
    Corporate calendar   
    Analyst conference   
          
    Minimum transparency defined by EU-Law 
General Standard Annual and interim financial statements 
    Disclosure of director's deadlines and ad-hoc disclosure 
    Shareholder stake and takeover reporting 
          
          
Regulated Unofficial Market (Open Market)     
          
Entry Standard Respective corporate filings   
    Annual and interim reports   
    Corporate calendar   
    Corporate profile   
          
First Quotation Minimum transparency defined by EU-Law 
    Insider trading rules   
    Market abuse rules   
    Takeover rules     
          
          
            (Source: DBAG, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
